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ABSTRACT
The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM
Directive) introduced a change of paradigm with regard to the liability of
some platforms in the European Union. Under the safe harbour rules of
the Directive on electronic commerce (E-Commerce Directive),
intermediaries in the EU were shielded from liability for acts of their users
committed through their services, provided they had no knowledge of it.
Although platform operators could be required to help enforce copyright
infringements online by taking down infringing content, the E-commerce
Directive also drew a very clear line that intermediaries could not be
obliged to monitor all communications of their users and install general
filtering mechanisms for this purpose. The Court of Justice of the
European Union confirmed this in a series of cases, amongst other reasons
because filtering would restrict the fundamental rights of platform
operators and users of intermediary services. Twenty years later, the
regime for online intermediaries in the EU has fundamentally shifted with
the adoption of Article 17 CDSM Directive, the most controversial and
hotly debated provision of this piece of legislation. For a specific class of
online intermediaries called “online content-sharing providers”
(OCSSPs), uploads of infringing works by their users now result in direct
liability and they are required undertake “best efforts” to obtain
authorization for such uploads. With this new responsibility come further
obligations, which oblige OCSSPs to make best efforts to ensure that
works for which they have not obtained authorization are not available on
their services. How exactly OCSSPs can comply with this obligation is
still unclear. However, it seems unavoidable that compliance will require
them to install measures such as automated filtering (so-called “upload
filters”) using algorithms to prevent users from uploading unlawful
content. Given the scale of the obligation, there is a real danger that
measures taken by OCSSPs in fulfilment of their obligation will amount
to expressly prohibited general monitoring. What seems certain however
is that the automated filtering, whether general or specific in nature,
cannot distinguish appropriately between illegitimate and legitimate use
of content (e.g. because it would be covered by a copyright limitation).
Hence, there is a serious risk of over-blocking of certain uses that benefit
from strong fundamental rights justifications such as the freedom of
expression and information or freedom of artistic creativity.
This article first outlines the relevant fundamental rights as guaranteed
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European
Convention of Human Rights that are affected by an obligation to monitor
and filter for copyright infringing content. Second, it examines the impact
on fundamental rights of the obligations OCSSPs incur under Article 17,
which are analysed and tested also with regard to their compatibility with
general principles of EU law such as proportionality and legal certainty.
These are, on the one hand, obligations to prevent the upload of works for
3

which they have not obtained authorization and, on the other, an
obligation to remove infringing content upon notification and prevent the
renewed upload in relation to these works and protected subject matter
(so-called “stay down”- obligations). Third, the article assesses the
mechanisms to safeguard the right of users of online content-sharing
services under Article 17. The analysis demonstrates that the balance
between the different fundamental rights in the normative framework of
Article 17 CDSM Directive is a very difficult one to strike and that overly
strict and broad enforcement mechanisms will most likely constitute an
unjustified and disproportionate infringement of the fundamental rights
of platform operators as well as of users of such platforms. Moreover,
Article 17 is the result of hard-fought compromises during the elaboration
of the Directive which led to the adoption of a long provision with
complicated wording and full of internal contradictions. As a
consequence, it does not determine with sufficient precision the balance
between the multiple fundamental rights affected, nor does it provide for
effective harmonization. These conclusions are of crucial importance for
the development of the regulatory framework for the liability of platforms
in the EU since the CJEU will have to rule on the compatibility of Article
17 with fundamental rights in the near future, as a result of an action for
annulment of introduced by the Polish government. In fact, if certain
features of that article are to be considered incompatible with the
constitutional framework of the EU, this should lead to the erasing of
certain paragraphs and, possibly, even of the entire provision from the text
of the CDSM directive.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The obligation of hosting platforms to partake in the enforcement of
copyright infringement has been subject since 2000 to the legal
framework of the E-Commerce Directive (ECD). This directive provides
liability exemptions for certain types of intermediaries when users
commit unlawful acts on their services, including copyright
infringements. The evolution of online services, giving users vast
possibilities to upload autonomously copyright-protected content,
combined with the will to involve more strongly the platforms in the
copyright enforcement process however recently induced the European
Union (EU) legislator to revise the legal framework and to burden certain
types of hosting services, called “online content-sharing service providers
(OCSSPs)”, with more responsibilities.
With the Directive on Copyright in a Digital Single Market (CDSM
Directive), the EU creates in Art. 17(a) special liability regime for this
specific category of online platforms. It makes OCSSPs directly liable for
acts of their users when they upload content onto their services and
thereby (potentially) infringe copyright. As a result, OCSSPs must
themselves obtain authorization for such uploads - or provide “best
efforts” to obtain authorization - and failure to do so triggers obligations
to ensure that unlawful content is not being made available or removed
upon request. According to Article 17(4) more specifically, OCSSPs are
required to comply with a complicated combination of obligations that
require them to undertake “best efforts” to (1) obtain authorization for
content uploaded by their users, (2) to prevent the availability of
unauthorized content, and (3) to remove unauthorized content and to
ensure its future unavailability in order to avoid liability.
However, the new legal framework does not only significantly affect
OCSSPs in the way they organize their services but will also considerably
impact the interests of users of such platforms as well as rightholders
whose works and other subject matter are shared on such services. If the
directive strongly affirms that the measures required under Article 17(4)
should under no circumstances lead to general monitoring obligation for
online content-sharing services (Art. 17(8)), reinforcing a fundamental
principle of the established EU platform liability regime, it is very likely
that OCSSPs will have no other option but to resort to automated
enforcement (i.e., the algorithmic identification and filtering of
potentially infringing content) in order to fulfil the obligation imposed on
them. Filtering infringing content without checking the legality of every
upload of all the works notified by rightholders leads potentially to an
unsolvable contradiction. Moreover, automated enforcement by way of
filtering and monitoring will inevitably affect lawful content uploaded by
5

users due to the technological limitations of monitoring and filtering
technology, frustrating their ability to express themselves, to disseminate
their creativity and to share and receive information.
The impacts of the new liability system provided by the CDSM
directive on the various interests and fundamental rights of users,
rightholders and the platforms are significant and therefore necessitate a
very careful assessment to ensure its compatibility with the EU treaties
and thus with the fundamental principles at the core of the EU
construction. In the past, the CJEU’s case-law on intermediary liability
has shaped this complex triangular relationship in the light of fundamental
rights. The introduction of additional obligations for specific types of
intermediaries requires revisiting this relationship in an Article 17
scenario. Therefore, this study re-examines the balance between the
various fundamental rights and other interests in the light of the rights and
obligations defined in Article 17 in general, and specifically the
obligations for OCSSPs to filter certain types of content in Article 17(4).
Such a re-examination seems essential as national legislators are currently
(or soon will be) struggling with the implementation of the CDSM
Directive in their national law. The new legislative framework for certain
hosting platforms has also led to strong criticism among the academic
community for its problematic implications and imbalances; the new
liability system has then been challenged by Poland before the CJEU
immediately after the adoption of the directive, requesting for the
annulment of the disputed article in parts or in full.
One of the main criticisms aims at the incompatibility of Article 17
with European fundamental rights. These rights are guaranteed, for acts
of the EU, by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(EUCFR) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The rights contained in these
instruments have been interpreted and further, especially in relation to the
online environment, shaped by the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Accordingly, the provisions
of the CDSM Directive have to be interpreted in the light of these two
instruments and the jurisprudence of their respective courts. Their rich
case-law provides guidance on the conflicts and challenges created by
Article 17 CDSM Directive, including:
The right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive and
impart information, and the right to artistic freedom are significantly
restricted if the obligations of Article 17 CDSM Directive can only be met
by the use of automated filtering. Automated filtering leads to the
inaccessibility of content shared on online content-sharing platforms,
thereby frustrating the rights of users in a significant manner.
Furthermore, users uploading content, which is caught by automated
filtering mechanisms, would be restricted in their right to impart
information, including such information that could be lawfully made
6

available under an exception or limitation to copyright. These legitimate
uses such as e.g. for quotations, criticism, review or parody purposes
benefit from a very strong fundamental rights justification which the
directive otherwise explicitly aims to safeguard (Art 17 (7)). Thus, any
automated filtering inevitably induced by Art. 17 that would be incapable
of recognizing and respecting these legitimate uses would not be only
violating the explicit will of the legislature but also important rights in a
democratic society.
Requiring OCSSPs to take a more active role in the enforcement of
copyright requires them to invest significant financial and human
resources in order to comply with their new obligations under Article 17
CDSM. Burdening private businesses with such broad tasks, coupled with
legal uncertainty resulting from the vagueness of the obligations imposed
on OCSSPs, restricts their freedom to conduct business as protected by
Art. 16 of the Charter, as the CJEU recalled on numerous occasions. In
the context of Article 17, this relates, first, to the requirement to cooperate
with rightholders and to conclude licensing agreements for content
uploaded by their users, second to verify that this content does not fall
under an exception and limitation in one of the 27 member states, which
is extremely challenging as these are not harmonized, and finally to
disable and prevent access to content for which no authorization has been
obtained and is not covered by a limitation. All these new obligations are
very heavy and complex to implement. Therefore, they must be
considered in the light of the fundamental right of freedom to conduct
business, as well as with regard to the principle of proportionality and
legal certainty.
Automated enforcement necessarily requires the processing of
personal data and enforcing copyright infringements necessitates
disclosing such information to injured parties or law enforcement
authorities. The data of users, i.e. when and what they upload and
download to and from online content-sharing platforms, is protected by
the right to the protection of personal data and the respect for private and
family life. In cases of alleged violations of copyright, these rights conflict
with the right to property of rightholders. In this regard, the CJEU has
already determined that the general filtering of user data to prevent
infringements cannot be reconciled with the fundamental rights of users,
but also those of platform operators.
One of the main objectives advanced for Article 17 CDSM Directive
is to provide rightholders with better control over the unauthorized
exploitation of their works and other subject matter. In this regard, it must
be considered that the right to property does not provide absolute
protection and that the right needs also to serve a social function, which
takes particular shape in the normative framework of copyright. The
protection provided for rightholders by Article 17 CDSM Directive and
its specific application must have regard to these underlying principles
and must guide the definition of the obligations of OCSSPS to partake in
the protection of copyright but also the restriction of the rights of users,
specifically the rights to freedom of expression and artistic freedom.
7

The obligation to monitor ex post or ex ante content to be uploaded
on the platform will inevitably lead to numerous conflicts between the
interests of rightholders and users because of too restrictive filtering
mechanism that disables lawful uses, or the failure to remove unlawful
content. The settlement of these disputes implicates the right to an
effective remedy, both for users and rightholders. Problematic in this
regard is the forum in which these disputes are settled and in which the
unlawfulness of uploaded content is determined. Because the interests at
stake are grounded in fundamental rights, private dispute settlement
managed only by platform operators or rightholders is likely not to be
compliant with procedural fundamental rights and poses a delicate
question of legitimacy with regard to who decide which content should
be available on these platforms.
In short, the obligation imposed on OCSSPs under Article 17(4) will
make it unavoidable that platforms within the scope of the provision will
monitor and filter content uploaded by their users by automated means.
This is the result of legal drafting that fails to determine the balance
between the relevant fundamental rights at EU level. It is constitutionally
highly problematic that a prerogative and obligation of the EU legislator
would have to be performed by national legislators, with outcomes that
will most likely result in a lack of full harmonization in crucial areas of
copyright law and, as a result, legal uncertainty in the EU.
The automated enforcement that is almost certain to emerge will
significantly restrict the fundamental rights of users of these platforms by
preventing the availability of lawful uploads. To safeguard the rights of
platform users, specifically their right to receive and impart information,
it is absolutely necessary to control and limit the scope of automated
enforcement as much as possible, to prevent for example only the upload
of content that is manifestly illegal. What is manifestly illegal and what
constitutes permissible automated enforcement mechanisms is however a
difficult and complex assessment and should not be left for private actors
to decide, as this qualification will affect the exercise of important
fundamental rights that are of crucial importance for the guarantee of a
democratic and pluralistic society. For this reason, it is suggested that an
independent institution is set up at EU level to monitor the
implementation and application of Art. 17 in a fundamental rightscompliant manner. This institution could take the form of a supervisory
body that would also perform alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
functions, ensuring that disputes arising in relation to uploaded content
are settled impartially and in an efficient, but fundamental rightscompliant manner. In addition, this institution could be tasked with, inter
alia, issuing guidelines for the interpretation of Article 17, developing
best practices together with stakeholders, provide for empirical data to
assess its impacts, and to recommend - if proven necessary improvements to policy makers. Only under this condition could the
liability system created by Art. 17 provide for sufficient guarantees for
8

fundamental rights and basic legal principles of EU law, securing that
what is available online results not solely from automated technological
means or the decisions of private economic players. In the absence of such
an institution, it is hard to imagine how Article 17 could be “saved” from
an annulment by the CJEU.
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INTRODUCTION
After a long political and public debate, the European legislator
adopted the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM
Directive)1 in April 2019.2 One of its core provisions redefines the
liability regime for specific online platforms by creating new obligations
for large content-hosting platforms, so-called online content-sharing
service providers (OCSSPs).3 According to the Directive, this change of
paradigm in the liability system is meant to reflect the changing realities
of how works and other subject matter protected by copyright are
accessed online.4 Because of their special position, OCSSPs are from now
on considered to perform copyright relevant acts when their users upload
content.5 In turn, Article 17 CDSM Directive establishes an extremely
complicated system of conditions under which OCSSPs can avoid
liability.
Article 17 has come under heavy critique,6 notably for the effects it is
likely to have on various fundamental rights (FR).7 The effects of the
1

Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending
Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92-125 (CDSM Directive).
2
Providing a general overview of the Directive: João Pedro Quintais, The New
Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: A Critical Look, 42(1) European
Intellectual Property Review (2020), 28-41 and Séverine Dusollier, The 2019 Directive
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Some progress, a few bad choices, and an
overall failed ambition, 57(4) Common Market Law Review (2020), 979-1030.
3
These service providers are defined in Article 2(6) and Recital 62 CDSM Directive, see
infra 3.1.
4
Recital 61 CDSM Directive.
5
Article 17(1) CDSM Directive.
6
See for example Felipe Romero Moreno, ‘Upload filters’ and human rights:
implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market,
34(2) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology (2020), 153-182 and
Christina Angelopoulos, & João Pedro Quintais, Fixing Copyright Reform: A Better
Solution to Online Infringement, 10(2) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information
Technology and E-Commerce Law (2019), 147-172.
7
A number of extensive studies have been published on the various aspects on Article
17, including its effects on fundamental rights, see e.g. Matthias Leistner, European
Copyright Licensing and Infringement Liability Under Art. 17 DSM-Directive
Compared to Secondary Liability of Content Platforms in the U.S. – Can We Make the
New European System a Global Opportunity Instead of a Local Challenge? Zeitschrift
für Geistiges Eigentum/Intellectual Property Journal (ZGE/IPJ), Issue 2, p. 123-214,
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572040 (2020), 1-78; Julia Reda,
Joschka Selinger, & Michael Servatius, Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the
Digital Single Market: a Fundamental Rights Assessment (Study for Gesellschaft für
Freiheitsrechte),
(December
2020),
available
at
SSRN:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3732223; Martin Senftleben, &
Christina Angelopoulos, The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring
Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the ECommerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single
Market (October 22, 2020), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3717022;
Gerald Spindler, Art. 17 DSM-RL und dessen Vereinbarkeit mit primärem Europarecht.
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basic intermediary liability regime under the Directive on electronic
commerce (ECD)8 and under the Directive on copyright and related rights
in the information society (InfoSoc Directive)9 on the exercise of FR by
intermediaries, rightholders and users of hosting platforms has been
subject to a number of preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU).10 In this jurisprudence, the Court has ruled out
that online intermediaries can incur obligations requiring them to install
general monitoring and filtering mechanisms to identify and block
copyright-infringing content.11
Zugleich ein Beitrag zu Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten, 122(3) Gewerblicher Rechtschutz
und
Urheberrecht
(2020),
253-261;
Gerald
Spindler,
Upload-Filter:
Umsetzungsoptionen zu Art. 17 DSM-RL, Computer und Recht (2020), 50-59, further
suggestions and commentaries have been made by a wider range of relevant
organizations and groups of scholars, also on plans for national implementation, see for
example: The European Copyright Society, Comment of the European Copyright
Society. Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in
the Digital Single Market into National Law, 11(2) Journal of Intellectual Property,
Information Technology and E-Commerce Law (2020), 115-131; ALAI, DRAFT
OPINION on certain aspects of the implementation of Article 17 of Directive (EU)
2019/790 of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the digital single market,
available at: https://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/200330-opinion-article-17directive-2019_790-en.pdf, accessed: 25.01.2021; ALAI, DRAFT OPINION on certain
aspects of the implementation of Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of 17 April 2019
on copyright and related rights in the digital single market, available at:
https://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/200330-opinion-article-17-directive2019_790-en.pdf, accessed: 25.01.2021; Hilty et al., Gesetz über die urheberrechtliche
Verantwortlichkeit von Diensteanbietern für das Teilen von Online-Inhalten
(Urheberrechts-Diensteanbieter-Gesetz
–
UrhDaG)Stellungnahme
zum
Referentenentwurf
vom
2.
September
2020,
available
at:
https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_UrhD
aG_Referententwurf_MPI.pdf, accessed: 25.01.2021.
8
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market (’Directive on electronic commerce’), OJ L 178,
17.7.2000, p. 1–16 (e-Commerce Directive).
9
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society, OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, p. 10-19 (InfoSoc Directive). This directive does not
foresee a specific liability standard, but simply refers to the liability regime established
by the e-Commerce directive (Recital 16).
10
See for example CJEU, Judgment of 29.01.2008, Promusicae, Case C-275/06,
EU:C:2008:54; CJEU, Judgment of 24.11.2011, Scarlet Extended, Case C-70/10,
EU:C:2011:771; CJEU, Judgment of 16.06.2012, SABAM v Netlog, Case C-360/10,
EU:C:2012:85; CJEU, Judgment of 27.03.2014, UPC Telekabel Wien, Case C-314/12,
EU:C:2014:192; CJEU, Judgement of 15.09.2016, Mc Fadden, C-484/14,
EU:C:2016:689; see also the ongoing proceedings in YouTube, for which the AG
delivered his Opinion, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, Opinion of 16.07.2020, YouTube,
Joined Cases C-682/18 and C-683/18, EU:C:2020:586.
11
See Stefan Kulk, & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Filtering for copyright
enforcement in Europe after the Sabam cases, 34(11) European Intellectual Property
Review (2012), 791-795; Christina Angelopoulos, Are blocking injunctions against ISPs
allowed in Europe? Copyright enforcement in the post-Telekabel EU legal landscape,
9(10) Journal of Intellectual Property Law (2014), 812-821; see for further references
Stefan Kulk, Internet Intermediaries and Copyright Law, Towards a Future-proof EU
Legal Framework, (Ridderprint:Alblasserdam, 2018); Aleksandra Kuczerawy,
Intermediary Liability and Freedom of Expression in the EU: From Concepts to
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The extent to which intermediaries, and hosting providers in
particular, can incur liability for infringements committed by their users
was discussed intensively leading up to the adoption of the CDSM
Directive.12 It comes therefore as no surprise that, immediately after its
adoption, the provision of the CDSM Directive that re-balances the
delicate distribution of duties and responsibilities between rightholders,
users and intermediaries has been challenged on FR grounds by the Polish
Government before the CJEU.13
At the core of this discussion lies the question under which
circumstances and in which way intermediaries are obliged to take
measures to ensure that copyright and related rights are not infringed via
their services. While the regime of the ECD provided for relatively broad
‘safe harbours’,i.e. liability exclusions for intermediaries,14 the new
sectoral regime under Article 17 CDSM Directive redesigned liability

Safeguards, (Intersentia:Cambridge, 2018); For a comparative perspective: Folkert
Wilman, The Responsibility of Online Intermediaries for Illegal User Content in the EU
and the US, (Edward Elgar Publishing:Cheltenham, Northampton, 2020).
12
See e.g. The European Copyright Society (2020) and Joao Pedro Quintais et al.,
Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital
Single Market Directive: Recommendations from European Academics, 10(3) Journal
of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law (2019), 277282.
13
CJEU, Action brought on 24 May 2019- Republic of Poland v European Parliament
and Council of the European Union, (Case C-401/19). According to the pleas in law and
main arguments, “the Republic of Poland seeks the annulment of Article 17(4)(b) and
Article 17(4)(c), in fine” (…), or, “should the Court find that the contested provisions
cannot be deleted from Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 without substantively
changing the rules contained in the remaining provisions of that article, the Republic of
Poland claims that the Court should annul Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 in its
entirety”.
14
Articles 12-15 ECD exempt information society service providers from liability if they
comply with the respective conditions. Particularly relevant for hosting providers is
Article 14 ECD, which provides that information society service providers who offer a
service which “consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the
service” are not liable for such information if “(a) the provider does not have actual
knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not
aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is
apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.” Article 15 provides
further that services that fall under Articles 12-14 shall not be required to generally
monitor or filter information or to actively seek information that could indicate illegal
activities; see for a detailed analysis and further references: Mark D. Cole, Christina
Etteldorf & Carsten Ullrich, Cross-Border Dissemination of Online Content, (BadenBaden: Nomos, 2020), pp. 188-200, see for a good summary Giancarlo Frosio, &
Christophe Geiger, Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously in the Digital Service Act’s
Platform
Liability
Regime,
available
at
SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=37477
56 (2020), 1-44, p. 8; and Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the ‘Value Gap’: How
the Music Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22(2) Vanderbilt Journal of
Entertainment and Technology Law (2020), 323-358. See in general with many further
inspiring contributions the comprehensive volume edited by Giancarlo Frosio, The
Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2020).
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exemptions for OCSSPs as a specific class of intermediaries.15
In 2012, SABAM v Netlog16 set out the parameters of filtering
obligations in the triangular relationship between the various FR of
rightholders, users and intermediaries in the context of the liability regime
of the ECD.17 In SABAM v Netlog, the CJEU determined that hosting
providers cannot be required to install systems that monitor or filter “most
of the information stored by the hosting service provider” to avoid all
present and future infringements. The expenses incurred by such an
obligation would “result in a serious infringement of the freedom of the
hosting service provider to conduct its business since it would require that
hosting service provider to install a complicated, costly, permanent
computer system at its own expense”.18 The Court further stressed that a
general monitoring obligation would infringe the rights of users of hosting
services, most notably the right to protection of personal data and the right
to receive and impart information.19 As a result, a general monitoring
obligation as a measure to protect the property rights of copyright holders
does not strike a fair balance between the various FR concerned.
The statutory language of Article 17 is relatively vague and merely
requires that OCSSPs “ensure the unavailability of specific works”.20
Although the text of the directive avoids references to monitoring or
filtering, it is widely agreed among commentators that some sort of
automated content control will be necessary to fulfil the obligations
arising under Article 17(4) CDSM.21 This potentially stands in
contradiction to the interpretation of Article 16 EU Charter as interpreted
in SABAM v Netlog and the express prohibition of general filtering and

15

See e.g. for a comprehensive summary Quintais, EIPR (2020).
CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, see also CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended for an
almost identical judgment on the obligations of internet access providers.
17
CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, paras. 39-50.
18
CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, para. 46; see further for a more nuanced assessment
of the impact of Article 17 on the right to conduct a business of platform operators Reda,
& Selinger, Article 17’s impact on freedom to conduct a business – Part 1, available at:
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/18/article-17s-impact-on-freedom-toconduct-a-business-part-1/, accessed: 25.01.2021 and part 2, available at:
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/19/article-17s-impact-on-freedom-toconduct-a-business-part-2/, accessed: 25.01.2021.
19
CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, paras. 47-50.
20
Article 17(4)(b) CDSM Directive.
21
See e.g. Karina Grisse, After the storm—examining the final version of Article 17 of
the new Directive (EU) 2019/790, 14(11) Journal of Intellectual Property Law &
Practice (2019), 887-899, p. 894; Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 259; Giancarlo Frosio, &
Sunimal Mendis, Monitoring and Filtering: European Reform or Global Trend, in:
Giancarlo Frosio (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 561 sq; Sebastian Schwemer, & Jens Schovsbo,
What is Left of User Rights? – Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement and Free Speech in
the Light of the Article 17 Regime, in: Paul Torremans (ed.), Intellectual Property Law
and Human Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2020), p. 574:
“Given the practical infeasibility of handling a large number of user uploads, the
difficulty in identifying previously blocked content without technical means (…), the
use of such algorithmic solutions is likely, akin to a de facto imposition”.
16
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monitoring obligations for intermediaries22 and specifically OCSSPs.23
The new Article 17 regime expressly overrides the existing safe
harbour provision of the ECD and the InfoSoc Directive24 and
foreshadows broader obligations for online intermediaries in the EU’s
Digital Services Act currently under discussion.25 Under the ECD-regime,
intermediaries incurred an obligation to remove content upon notification.
Article 17 establishes a system based on cooperation between rightholders
and users that includes elements of the ECD-regime. Pursuant to Article
17(1) OCSSPs perform relevant acts of communication to the public in
relation to content uploaded by their users. For these acts, OCSSPs must
make “best efforts” to obtain authorization from the relevant
rightholders.26 Failure to obtain authorization triggers an obligation to
ensure that works or other subject matter for which authorization could
not be obtained are made unavailable on a hosting platform with the help
of information provided by rightholders.27 To achieve this outcome,
OCSSPS must undertake “best efforts”, a standard of care that also
applies to a secondary obligation which, in its formulation, resembles, but
is not identical to, the liability exemption of Article 14 ECD.28 Pursuant
to Article 17(4)(c) OCSSPS must “in any event” expeditiously remove
infringing content after notification and ensure its future unavailability,
thus establishing what has been called a “notice and stay down”
mechanism.29 The requirement to make content unavailable, i.e. to block
and to filter user uploads, clashes with the guarantees provided in Article
22

Article 15(1) ECD.
Article 17(8) CDSM Directive.
24
Cf. Article 17(3) CDSM Directive; it is interesting to note that this results in a conflict
between the e-Commerce Directive and the InfoSoc Directive with the CDSM Directive
as the liability regime of the latter is different from the former two. This is surprising, as
Article 1(2) of the CDSM Directive clearly states that “except in the cases referred to in
Article 24, this Directive shall leave intact and shall in no way affect existing rules laid
down in the directives currently in force in this area, in particular Directives 96/9/EC,
2000/31/EC, 2001/29/EC, 2006/115/EC, 2009/24/EC, 2012/28/EU and 2014/26/EU”.
Thus, there is, on the one side, the liability regime for OCSSPs as defined by the CDSM
Directive and, on the other, the liability regime for other intermediaries as defined by the
e-Commerce Directive. How these incoherencies will be solved by national legislators
and courts when it comes to implementing the Directive is unclear, but this contradiction
seems hard to reconcile with the principle of legal certainty that governs EU law.
25
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) an amending
Directive 200/21/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, Brussels, European Commission,
15.12.2020, on FR and intermediary liability under the Digital Services Act see the
recent study by Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020) and Christina Angelopoulos,
Intermediary Liability, Fundamental Rights and the Digital Services Act (Weekend
Edition no. 42), available at: https://eulawlive.com/weekend-edition/weekend-editionno42/, accessed: 25.01.2021.
26
Article 17(4)(a) CDSM Directive.
27
Article 17(4)(b) CDSM Directive.
28
Contrary to the liability exemption of Article 14 ECD, the ‘best efforts’ obligations
arising under Article 17 CDSM Directive do not require knowledge to incur liability.
29
See e.g. Aleksandra Kuczerawy, From ‘Notice and Takedown’ to ‘Notice and Stay
Down’: Risks and Safeguards for Freedom of Expression, in: Giancarlo Frosio (ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2020).
23
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17(7), pursuant to which users of hosting platforms shall not be prevented
from uploading lawful consent and, in particular, to exercise certain
exceptions and limitations specifically provided for in Article 17(7)(a) &
(b).30 Against this background, it is appropriate and necessary to review
the rifts created by monitoring and filtering obligations in the FR
landscape of the EU.31
The new liability regime and its inherent conflicts raises two
important questions. First, whether Article 17 CDSM and in particular the
‘best efforts’ obligation creates a fair balance between the various
interests and FR concerned, in particular with regard to user’s rights that
Article 17(7) mandates to safeguard. Second, if the first question is
answered in the affirmative, how could procedural mechanisms guarantee
that a balance that has only been sketched the CDSM Directive is
maintained in practice.
This study proceeds as follows: First, we will briefly outline the
general European framework of FR protection, (2.1.) and the principle of
proportionality which serves as the mechanism to reconcile conflicts
between those rights and between rights and other interests (2.2.) as it
applies to copyright law. Subsequently, we outline the scope of protection
of the relevant FR (2.3.) and the general principles of market
harmonization and legal certainty (2.4). Second, we will provide a brief
overview of the mechanisms of Article 17 CDSM (3.1.) and of the
technological aspects of automated filtering and monitoring and its
limitations (3.2.). Third, we will in detail examine the effects of
automated filtering mechanisms and notice and stay-down obligations on
the various FR with particular reference to Article 17 CDSM (3.5.).
Fourth, we review suggested solutions on how to implement Article 17 in
compliance with FR (3.6.) before briefly summarizing our findings (4.)

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF PLATFORM LIABILITY
Mass-scale online copyright enforcement and FR are difficult to
reconcile. In fact, in order to identify and control potentially infringing
content, given the extremely large amount of content uploaded on
platforms every day, monitoring and filtering information seems
unavoidable at least to some extent.32 This in turn potentially affects the
rights of users and the general public to disclosure of information and
restricts access to information made available on online platforms.
30

For further discussion, see e.g. Schwemer, & Schovsbo, What is Left of User Rights?
– Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement and Free Speech in the Light of the Article 17
Regime in: Torremans (2020), p. 569 sq.
31
See on this issue Reda et al. (2020); Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October
2020), p. 17 sq. For a horizontal approach on automated enforcement, platform liability
and FR, see also Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020), at p. 12 sq.
32
This position is implicit in the CJEU’s arguments in CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended
and CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog. By prohibiting general filtering, the Court
acknowledges that one way to enforce copyright is to install filtering and monitoring
mechanisms.
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Furthermore, in order to be able to cope with obligations to identify and
monitor copyright infringement, platform operators are obliged to install
costly mechanisms involving technical and human resources, which can
have severe implications on their business in particular (but not only) for
small or middle-sized companies33.
The CJEU has developed the scope of the obligations of online
intermediaries and the rights of users in relation to copyright enforcement
with reference to, and in the light of FR,34 which is why a discussion on
monitoring and filtering obligations cannot be decoupled from a FR
discourse.35 As a norm of secondary EU law, Article 17 CDSM must be
interpreted in the light of primary EU law, which includes FR. 36
The systemic role of fundamental rights in the EU legal order
FR are an integral element in the EU’s constitutional order. Prior to
their codification in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR),37
the CJEU developed FR as general principles from the common

33
See in this sense, Evan Engstrom, & Nick Feamster, The Limits of Filtering: A Look
at the Functionality & Shortcomings of Content Detection Tools, Available at:
https://www.engine.is/the-limits-of-filtering (2017), accessed 25.01.2021, p. 22 sq.
(according to which “filtering tools are prohibitively expensive for many small OSPs”
and giving examples of the costs of filtering systems).
34
See specifically CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended; CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog;
CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden and CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien, further the
ECtHR assessed intermediary liability with respect to defamatory content in ECtHR
(Grand Chamber), 16 June 2015, case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, Appl. no. 64569/09 and
ECtHR (Fourth Section), 2 February 2016, case of Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók
Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, Appl. no. 22947/13; see specifically Christophe
Geiger, & Elena Izyumenko, The Role Of Human Rights In Copyright Enforcement
Online: Elaborating A Legal Framework For Website Blocking, 32(1) American
University International Law Review (2016), 43-115.
35
Cf. Matthias Leistner, European Copyright Licensing and Infringement Liability
Under Art. 17 DSM-Directive Compared to Secondary Liability of Content Platforms in
the U.S. – Can We Make the New European System a Global Opportunity Instead of a
Local Challenge?, 12(2) Zeitschrift für Geistiges Eigentum/Intellectual Property Journal
(2020), 123-214, p. 17.
36
On the implication of fundamental rights for the interpretation of copyright law see
Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of
Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37(4) International
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition (2006), 371-406; Christophe Geiger,
Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU Level, in: Estelle Derclaye (ed.),
Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, (Cheltenham, Northampton:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 27-48; Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights as
Common Principles of European (and International) Intellectual Property Law, in:
Ansgar Ohly (ed.), Common Principles of European Intellectual Property Law,
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012) 223-238; Christophe Geiger, Reconceptualizing the
Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property- An Update, in: Paul Torremans (ed.),
Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
International, 2020), 115-161; Michael Goldhammer, Taking Constitutionalization
Seriously: European IP Law, Weak Fundamental Rights and the Network of Courts,
GRUR Int. 2021 (forthcoming).
37
CJEU, Judgment of 26.02.2013, Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105,
para. 29.
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constitutional traditions of the Member States.38 FR therefore sit at the top
of the EU’s hierarchy of norms along with the Treaties39 and the general
principles of EU law.40 All FR of the EUCFR are of equal value and no
hierarchy exists between them,41 their scope corresponds to that of the
respective rights provided for by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).42 This
relationship is also illustrated by regular references by the CJEU to
judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).43
1. The Court’s standard of review
The intensity of the Court’s review of secondary copyright legislation
in the light of the EU Charter differs.44 In cases in which the CJEU is
asked to interpret EU law in the light of the Charter, the Luxembourg
court tends to give instructions to the national courts and then leaves it
“for the national court to ascertain” the correct application of national law
in the light of EU law, including the EU Charter. However, the more
precise the question submitted by national courts through the preliminary
reference route, the more likely is the Court to engage in a more detailed
analysis of balance of rights.45
2. Addressees of EU fundamental rights
According to Article 51 EUCFR “[t]he provisions of [the] Charter are
addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union
38

CJEU, Judgment of 14.05.1974, Nold, Case 4/73, EU:C:1974:51, para 13; see in
relation to copyright: CJEU, Judgment of 12.09.2006, Laserdisken II, Case C-479/04,
EU:C:2006:549, para. 61.
39
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 13–
45 (TEU); Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390 (TFEU).
40
Paul Craig, & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, (Oxford, New
York: Oxford University Press 2020), pp. 142-144.
41
For a diverging view see Alexander Peukert, The fundamental right to (intellectual)
property and the discretion of the legislature, in: Christophe Geiger (ed.), Research
Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, (Cheltenham, Northampton:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 132-148, who argues that the right to property should
not be considered at the same level as, for example, the right to freedom of expression
due to the “unique structure” of property rights and their existence and scope “as
‘creatures’ of the legislature”.
42
Article 52(3) EUCFR.
43
See for example CJEU, Judgment of 29.07.2019, Pelham and others, Case C-476/17,
EU:C:2019:624, para. 34.
44
Good examples for a thorough review are Sky Österreich (CJEU, Judgment of
22.01.2013, Sky Österreich, Case C-283/11, EU:C:2013:28) and, to a limited extent, the
ruling in Luksan (CJEU, Judgment of 9.02.2012, Luksan, Case C-277/10,
EU:C:2012:65). Both cases, albeit indirectly via the preliminary reference procedure
under Article 267 TFEU, challenged the validity of a provision of EU law or one of
national law that implemented EU law.
45
See for example, CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended, paras. 41-54 and CJEU, C-484/14
Mc Fadden, paras. 80-101, see also Kranenborg, in: Peers, Hervey, Kenner, & Ward,
2014, Article 8, para. 08.42.
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(…) and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union
law.”46 This means that the provisions of the Charter bind the European
legislature in all its activities and EU legislation must comply with FR.
Member States are only bound by the Charter when implementing EU
law.47 The CJEU has also underlined that the courts of the Member States
must have regard to EU FR when applying national law which serves to
implement obligation under EU law.48 In situations that are not fully
governed by EU law, Member States remain free to apply national FR
standards as long as their application does not compromise the primacy,
unity and effectiveness of EU law.49
3. Challenging fundamental rights incompatibilities
The consequences of FR infringements depend on the level at which
they occur. If an act of one or several EU institutions infringes a FR of
the EU legal order50, it can be challenged before the CJEU.51 Legislation
in particular can be subject to a challenge by one of the institutions or a
Member State under the procedure of Article 263 TFEU.52 For this
purpose, a party requesting review of a provision of a legislative act must
demonstrate that the provision in question constitutes an “infringement of
the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application.”53
Individuals can challenge a legislative measure, or any act of the
institutions for that purpose, indirectly via the preliminary reference

46

Article 51(1) EUCFR.
For example, Member States must transpose secondary legislation (i.e. directives) into
their national law in full compliance with the FR of the EU Charter. Therefore, national
legislatures must ensure that their transposition of secondary legislation relies on an
interpretation that ensures that a fair balance is struck between the various FR protected
under EU law. See e.g. CJEU, C-275/06 Promusicae para. 70; CJEU, Judgment of 18
October 2018, Bastei Lübbe, Case CC-149/17, EU:C:2018:841, para. 45, see also CJEU,
Judgment of 16.07.2015, Coty Germany, Case C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485, para. 34.
More generally see Craig, & de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (2020), pp.
430-431.
48
CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended; CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, but also CJEU,
C-484/14 Mc Fadden.
49
CJEU, Judgment of 29.07.2019, Funke Medien NRW, Case C-469/17,
EU:C:2019:623, para. 32.
50
E.g. by imposing a measure that in itself does not respect FR or, which in its particular
formulation does not strike a fair balance between various interests involved.
51
See e.g. the challenge brought by Poland against parts of Article 17(4) CDSM, in
which it alleges that the obligation to filter content to prevent copyright infringements
infringes the rights of users to receive and impart information, CJEU, Application of
26.07.2019, Case C-401/19, , see on this issue Bernd Justin Jütte, Finding the Balance
in Copyright Law: Internal and External Control Through Fundamental Rights, in: Paul
Torremans (ed.), Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, (4th ed., Alphen aan den
Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2020), pp. 481-482.
52
Under Article 263 challenges by individuals are nearly impossible, especially in
relation to generally applicable legislation. An individual application would have to
demonstrate direct and individual concern in order to challenge a directive, see Craig, &
de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (2020), pp. 546 sq.
53
Article 264, second sentence TFEU; a direct challenge to an act must be brought within
two months of the publication of the measure (Article 264, sixth sentence TFEU).
47
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procedure. Article 267 gives the CJEU competence to rule on “the validity
(…) of acts of the institutions (…) of the Union.”54
Article 6(1) TEU requires that the EU must respect FR as laid down
in the EU Charter and also guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.55
Accordingly, legislation that is incompatible with the EU Charter, any FR
included in the ECHR, or any general principle of EU law can be
challenged, as the Polish government has done in relation to certain
aspects of Article 17 CDSM Directive. To that effect, the CJEU
established in Schrems II that any EU legislative measure that constitutes
an interference with one or several FR must define the scope of the
limitation it has on the right concerned.56
Likewise, Member States, by failing to properly implement a
directive, can be found to be in violation of the Charter. A failure to
implement can include a failure to transpose a directive or a part of a
directive. However, Member States can also be sanctioned for failure to
implement a legislative measure in compliance with EU FR. This would
assume that the EU act itself complies with FR, but the exercise of
discretion left to the Member States when implementing the act has been
exercised to the effect that the implementing law does not fully respect
FR. This can be challenged, ordinarily by the Commission (and
exceptionally by another Member States),57 before the CJEU which can
find a Member State in violation of its obligation under the EU Treaties.
Such a challenge would still be possible, even if the Polish challenge were
to be unsuccessful, to ‘correct’ national implementations and enable the
CJEU to intervene (again) at a later point. Given the largely diverging
approaches to implementing the CDSM Directive, such a (further)
challenge is certainly not to be excluded.58
However, not every restriction of FR automatically constitutes a

54
Article 267, first sentence, subparagraph (a) TFEU; see for example CJEU, Judgment
of 01.03.2011, Test-Achats, Case C-236/09, EU:C:2011:100, see also CJEU, Judgment
of 08.04.2014, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, Case C-293/12,
EU:C:2014:238 and CJEU, Judgment of 06.10.2015, Schrems, Case C-362/14,
EU:C:2015:650.
55
Article 6(2) TEU.
56
CJEU, Judgment of 16.07.2020, Facebook Ireland and Schrems, Case C-311/18,
EU:C:2020:559, para. 175.
57
However, other Member States would first have to bring the matter before the
Commission. Only if the Commission fails to act, by delivering an opinion, within three
months can a Member State bring proceedings against another Member Sate before the
CJEU (see Article 259 TFEU).
58
As Oreste Pollicino, Giovanni Maria Riccio and Marco Bassini note in the introduction
of their timely edited collection, Copyright and Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age,
A Comparative Analysis in Search of a Common Constitutional Ground, (Cheltenham,
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), p. 1: “The challenges that Member
States will have to face in the implementation process of the DSM Directive largely
derive from the strained relationship between copyright and other competing rights such
as freedom of speech, data protection and freedom to conduct business”. For an overview
of the status of implementation in the various Member States see:
https://www.create.ac.uk/cdsm-implementation-resource-page/.
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failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties or other higher-ranking
EU law. In principle, FR can be limited as long as their essence is
respected.59 Furthermore, any limitation of a FR right must respect the
principle of proportionality. 60
Proportionality: The CJEU’s balancing methodology
The proportionality test is an analytical tool to determine the
permissibility of limiting certain rights. In Europe, it is applied by the
ECtHR and the CJEU to reconcile competing interests, often in the
context of FR as they are guaranteed and protected under the ECHR and
the EUCFR.61
The test of proportionality is divided into three steps.62 First, the test
requires to determine whether the contested measure is appropriate. To
meet this condition the measure must pursue a legitimate aim and must be
suitable to achieve that aim.63 Second, the measure must be necessary, in
other words whether the aim could be achieved by less onerous means.64
The third stage consists of a balancing exercise and is also referred to as
‘proportionality strictu sensu’. At this stage of the review the various
interests are balanced against each other.
The nature of the test is complex65 and its application by either court
does not perfectly reflect its formulation. Especially in multipolar
relationships of competing rights the test reveals its more flexible
nature.66 In the practice of the ECtHR, the test leaves Member States a

59

Article 52(1) EUCFR; see also to that effect AG Szpunar, Opinion of 12.12.2018,
Pelham and Others, Case C-476/17, EU:C:2018:1002, para. 98 and AG Szpunar,
Opinion of 6 June 2018, Bastei Lübbe, Case C-149/17, EU:C:2018:400, para. 38 and
CJEU, C-580/13 Coty Germany, para. 35. See also on this issue: Martin Husovec, The
Essence of Intellectual Property Rights Under Article 17(2) of the EU Charter, 20(6)
German Law Journal (2019), 840-863, with further references.
60
See further on the influence of this principle on EU copyright law, Ori Fischman Afori,
Proportionality – A New Mega Standard in European Copyright Law, 45(8)
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition (2014), 889-915.
61
In this function proportionality has also served to determine the scope of individual
FR, see Jonas Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of
proportionality, in: Christophe Geiger (ed.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and
Intellectual Property, (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), p.
19.
62
For one of the earlier applications of the test see CJEU, Judgment of 13.11.1990,
Fedesa, Case C-331/88, EU:C:1990:391, paras. 12-18.
63
This prong of the proportionality test is interpreted broadly; only measures which are
manifestly inappropriate, see Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies & Giorgio Monti,
European Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 387-388.
64
Article 17 creates an interesting constellation: the ‘necessity’ prong will not only have
to be considered in relation to the effects it has on users, and arguably rightholders, but
also on OCSSPs, whose obligation to implement enforcement measures has significant
effects on their business models.
65
Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in:
Geiger (2015), p. 19.
66
Cf. Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in:
Geiger (2015), p. 24.
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margin of discretion while ensuring a basic protection of FR.67 In any
case, at EU level, proportionality is a general principle of EU law and
therefore must guide the institutions,68 and the Member States in
implementing EU law. Accordingly, acts of the institutions and the
Member States are subject to judicial review in the light of the principle
of proportionality.69
Proportionality has become increasingly appealing for copyright law.
In this context, proportionality has almost become synonymous with the
notion of a ‘fair balance’.70 In particular in a digital or online environment,
in which the relations between the various interests of rightholders, users
and intermediaries cannot be precisely formulated into legal norms,
proportionality plays a decisive role.71

67

Cf. Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in:
Geiger (2015), p. 21, this is evidenced by the flexible interpretation of the second step,
which takes a liberal approach to the concept of ‘least onerous means’. The ECtHR
leaves member states a large margin of discretion to exercise their legislative and
regulatory powers while merely considering the second step within the context of the
other two to ascertain whether the means chosen to achieve a legitimate aim are not
unreasonable.
68
The formal requirements to be followed by the institution in applying the principle of
proportionality are set out in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union - PROTOCOLS - Protocol (No 2) on the application of the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 206-209. The CJEU
is however not always consistent in its application of the test and often folds the third
stage into one of the first two stages or omits it completely if the test already failed at an
earlier stage, see Craig, & Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (2020), p. 583.
69
Cf. Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, (Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), p. 655. The principle was introduced as a ground for judicial
review in CJEU, Judgment of 17.12.1970, Internationale Handelgesellschaft, Case 1170, EU:C:1970:114 and since 2009 is has been expressly recognized in Article 5(4)
TFEU and serves to justify possible limitations to the FR of the Charter (Article 52(1)
EUCFR). At the institutional level, Article 5 of the Protocol (No 2) on the Application
of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality obliges the legislator to demonstrate
that a legislative proposal complies with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality. See, for example, the impact assessment for the CDSM Directive
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment on
the modernisation of EU copyright rules. Accompanying the Document Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital
Single Market and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to
certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of
television and radio programmes, SWD(2016) 301 final, Brussels, European
Commission, 14.9.2016, at pp. 119, 155, 195-195; It is worth noting that in this
document the impact of the proposed legislative acts on fundamental right is examined
separately from proportionality assessments.
70
Cf. Peter Teunissen, The balance puzzle: the ECJ’s method of proportionality review
for copyright injunctions, 40(9) European Intellectual Property Review (2018), 579-593,
p. 581, Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in:
Geiger (2015), p 35, and Peter Oliver, & Christopher Stothers, Intellectual Property
under the Charter: are the Court’s scales properly calibrated?, 54(2) Common Market
Law Review (2017), 517-565, p. 546, all with references to CJEU, C-283/11 Sky
Österreich, paras. 50-68.
71
Fischman Afori describes the role of proportionality as an external standard that
enables “a constitutional balance to be struck within the copyright-private law sphere.
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The CJEU regularly interprets the European copyright acquis with
reference to proportionality.72 Due to the nature of harmonization (i.e.
mainly by means of directives) the Court uses proportionality to explore
the internal balance of copyright law and to help national courts shape
appropriate remedies to fight copyright infringements.73 It is also worth
She also projects a more prominent role with far reaching consequences for substantive
copyright law. Although she seems to suggest that proportionality would rather take the
form of an open norm that would guide the judicial development of substantive copyright
law, (Fischman Afori, IIC (2014), p. 900, see also Christophe Geiger, & Elena
Izyumenko, Towards a European “Fair Use” Grounded in Freedom of Expression, 35(1)
American University International Law Review (2019), 1-52) there is no reason to limit
this role to the judiciary (Fischman Afori, IIC (2014), p. 899). Nevertheless, the role of
proportionality in EU copyright law is best traced with reference to the jurisprudence of
the CJEU, see for a comprehensive summary Teunissen, EIPR (2018). For an interesting
critical approach see also Tuomas Mylly, Regulating with rights proportionality?
Copyright, fundamental rights and internet in the case law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union, in: Oreste Pollicino, Giovanni Maria Riccio and Marco Bassini (eds.),
Copyright and Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age, A Comparative Analysis in Search
of a Common Constitutional Ground, (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2020), p. 54.
72
Christophe Geiger, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union:
Harmonizing, Creating and sometimes Disrupting Copyright Law in the European
Union, in: Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright
Law, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2016), 435-446. Likewise, the
ECtHR makes regular reference to proportionality in the context of intellectual property
law, e.g. when assessing the appropriateness of criminal sanctions for large scale
copyright infringements, for example, when it found that a prison sentence and the award
of damages was not disproportionate to sanction large-scale online copyright
infringements ECtHR (5th section) of 19 February 2013, case of Fredrik Neij and Peter
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl. No.nr. 40397/12, under D., see for
example Bernd Justin Jütte, The Beginning of a (Happy?) Relationship: Copyright and
Freedom of Expression in Europe, 38(1) European Intellectual Property Review (2016),
11-22, p. 15. More generally on the use of the proportionality principle by the ECtHR in
copyright cases, see Christophe Geiger, & Elena Izyumenko, Shaping Intellectual
Property Rights through Human Rights Adjudication: The Example of the European
Court of Human Right, 46(3) Mitchell Hamline Law Review (2020), 527-612; Oleg
Soldatov, Copyright and fundamental rights in European Court of Human Rights case
law, in: Pollicino, Riccio & Bassini (eds.), Copyright and Fundamental Rights in the
Digital Age, (2021), p. 99. In another case, the Strasbourg Court considered the
obligations of an online news portal to moderate and filter harmful speech. It found a
moderate financial fine to be proportionate for failure to expeditiously remove harmful
and offensive speech (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 16 June 2015, case of Delfi AS v.
Estonia, Appl. no. 64569/09, paras. 140-161). The ECtHR stressed that the extreme
nature of the speech, in other words the intensity of the violation of the right to private
life (Article 8 ECHR) was a decisive factor in coming to this conclusion. However, it
also stressed that the relatively low fine imposed by the national court, as well as the
nature of the applicant, as a professional operator of a large online news portal, were
relevant considerations (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 16 June 2015, case of Delfi AS v.
Estonia, Appl. no. 64569/09, para. 160).
73
See for example CJEU, C-275/06 Promusicae; CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended;
CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog; CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien; CJEU, C484/14 Mc Fadden; CJEU, CC-149/17 Bastei Lübbe, but also reference to
proportionality pre-Lisbon in CJEU, C-479/04 Laserdisken II, para. 64; See for
overviews of the balancing case-law Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Property Aspects of
Intellectual Property, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 184-189,
Martin Husovec, Intellectual Property Rights and Integration by Conflict: The Past,
Present and Future, 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2016), 239-269
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noting that it often describes the functional steps of the principle of
proportionality, without expressly referring to it, and instead stresses the
necessity to “strike a fair balance”.74
In particular in a FR constellation such as the one underlying Article
17 of the CDSM Directive, proportionality plays an important role in
reflecting on the limitations on FR of rightholders, platform operators and
users. In order to conduct a proportionality assessment, it is, first,
instrumental to map the relevant FR, before applying the proportionality
analysis to the legal mechanism of Article 17.
The relevant fundamental rights with regard to platform liability
The competing FR in copyright law, in particular in relation to online
enforcement, have most recently been summarized by AG
Saugmandsgaard Øe in the YouTube case:75
“I note in this regard that in SABAM the Court ruled that
imposing on a platform operator a general obligation to filter the
information that it stores would not only be incompatible with
Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31, but also would not strike a
‘fair balance’ between the protection of the intellectual property
right enjoyed by rightholders and that of the freedom to conduct a
business enjoyed by service providers pursuant to Article 16 of the
Charter. Such an injunction would result in a serious infringement
of that freedom since it would require that operator to install a
complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its own
expense. In addition, such an obligation to carry out general
filtering would undermine the freedom of expression of the users
of that platform under Article 11 of the Charter, since the filtering
tool might not distinguish adequately between illegal content and
legal content, with the result that its introduction could lead to the
blocking of the latter category of content. I will add that such a
result would introduce a risk of undermining online creativity,
which would be contrary to Article 13 of the Charter. The danger
in that regard is that maximum protection of certain forms of
intellectual creativity is to the detriment of other forms of

and Teunissen, EIPR (2018). However, the methodological approaches chosen by the
Court have been criticized. While it permanently highlights the importance and centrality
of proportionality, the Court fails to provide guidance on how this important role should
be exercised, see e.g. Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Property Aspects of Intellectual Property
(2018), p. 192; Teunissen, EIPR (2018), p. 593; see however the more structured
analysis, for example, by AG Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel, in which he neatly
outlines the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of a blocking order: AG Cruz
Villalón, Opinion of 26.11.2013, UPC Telekabel Wien, Case C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781.
74
See for example CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended, paras. 45-46.
75
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, paras. 240-244 (references omitted); see
also Teunissen, EIPR (2018), p. 581; and with regard to platform liability, Frosio, &
Geiger, SSRN (2020), p. 14 sq.
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creativity which are also positive for society.”
1. Freedom of expression and information, freedom of the arts
The right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 ECHR
and Article 11 EUCFR, protects the right to hold opinions and the right
to receive an impart information. According to Article 52(3) the scope of
Article 11 CFREU is congruent with that of Article 10 ECHR.76 Article
13 EUCFR is closely linked to Article 11 and under the ECHR artistic
freedom is generally subsumed under the umbrella right of Article 10. The
right to freedom of expression can be enjoyed by natural as well as legal
persons, members of the public service of the Member States as well as
the EU.77
The right to freedom of expressions covers opinions, information and
ideas, and in general all types of information that can be communicated.
Article 11 EUCFR also protects information that offends, shocks or
disturbs others.78 The importance of the right to freedom of expression for
a democratic society and an individual’s participation in the public
exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all
kinds has been persistently underlined by both courts.79 The ECtHR has
acknowledged the protection of Article 10 ECHR for fashion
photography80 and internet peer-to-peer filesharing,81 however
recognized justified restrictions to the right to freedom of expression in
order to protect the right to (intellectual) property. Such restrictions are
permitted if these restrictions are prescribed by law and if they are
necessary in a democratic society.82 Both courts have also repeatedly
76

It is worth noting that Article 11(2) EUCFR guarantees media freedom and pluralism,
which are not recognized as independent rights under the ECHR.
77
CJEU, Judgment of 06.11.2011, Patriciello, Case C-163/10, EU:C:2011:543, para. 31.
However Member States cannot rely on the protection of Article 11 EUCFR, even if
indirectly through their officials, see CJEU, Judgment of 07.04.2007, AGM-COS.MET,
Case C-470/03, EU:C:2007:213, para. 72.
78
ECtHR (Plenary), 7 December 1976, case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Appl.
no. 5493/72, para. 49, ECtHR, ECtHR (Chamber), 24 May 1988, case of Müller and
Other v. Switzerland, Appl no. 10737/84, Judgment (1988), 24 May 1988, para. 33;
CJEU, Judgment of 04.10.1991, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland
v Grogan and Others, Case C-159/90, EU:C:1991:378, para. 30, see more recently
CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, para. 34.
79
See for example Christophe Geiger, & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human
Rights’ Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of
Expression, 42(3) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition (2014),
316-342; Christophe Geiger, & Izyumenko, Elena, Intellectual Property before the
European Court of Human Rights, in: Christophe Geiger, Craig Allen Nard, & Xavier
Seuba (eds.), Intellectual Property and the Judiciary, (Cheltenham, Northampton:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), p. 36 sq, see also Jütte, E.I.P.R. (2016).
80
ECtHR (5th section), 10 January 2013, case of Ashby Donald and other v. France,
Appl. no. 36769/08.
81
ECtHR (5th section) of 19 February 2013, case of Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde
Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl. nr. 40397/12.
82
Article 10(2) ECHR; when the right to freedom of expression comes into conflict with
the right to property, including copyright, this requires a balancing between two FR
under a proportionality assessment, leading, in effect to some sort of enhanced
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highlighted the importance of the right to freedom of expression on the
internet and, conversely the importance of the internet and the various
services offered through the internet for the exercise of the rights
protected by Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 EUCFR.83 In Scarlet
Extended, the CJEU stressed the importance of the internet to receive
information, in other words the ability of members of the public to receive
and gather information including storing such information.84 The right to
receive information is not merely limited to the passive reception of
information but will also include active research by individuals.85
The CJEU has found the right to freedom of expression to be an
obstacle to the free movement of goods and services, which, however, can
be justified. In discussing whether a public demonstration constituted an
obstacle to the free movement of goods in Schmidberger, the CJEU
pointed out that the right to freedom of expression is not absolute “but
must be viewed in relation to its social purpose.” Accordingly, limitations
to Article 11 EUCFR are possible as long as they are proportionate and
leave the essence of the fundamental right intact. In making this
assessment, Member States enjoy a wide margin of discretion.86 The
extent of this margin depends, among other factors, on the type

proportionality analysis. See for a detailed analysis Geiger, & Izyumenko, IIC (2014), p.
316. More generally on the balancing exercise of the ECtHR of intellectual property with
other FR see Geiger, & Izyumenko, Mitchell Hamline Law Review (2020).
83
ECtHR (Second Section), 1 December 2015, case of Cengiz and Others v. Turkey,
Applications nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, paras 49-50; in this case the Strasbourg Court
granted victim status to active users of the video-sharing platform YouTube. The Court
argued that the repercussions of a total block of the platform had significant
repercussions on their works as academics, as they had used the platform to support their
teaching activities and to promote their scientific activities and not merely as passive
users. In a similar case, the Court found a violation of Article 10 in an indiscriminate
blocking of Google sites, which also affected the website of the applicant (ECtHR
(Chamber), 18 December 2012, case of Yildirim v. Turkey, Appl. no. 3111/10).
Conversely, in ECtHR (Second Section), 11 March 2014, case of Akdeniz v. Turkey,
Appl. no. 20877/10 the Court found the application inadmissible as the applicant were
mere users of music websites, which moreover had been found to infringe copyright;
however, the judgment also makes reference to the paramount interest of internet users,
see further AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, para. 241 and CJEU, Judgment
of 08.09.2016, GS Media, Case C-160/15, EU:C:2016:644, para. 45.
84
CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended, para. 50.
85
AG Trstenjak, Opinion of 05.05.2011, MSD Sharp & Dohme, Case C-316/09,
EU:C:2010:712, para. 85. On the scope of the right to information, see also Christophe
Geiger, Droit d’auteur et droit du public à l’information, approche de droit comparé,
(Paris: LexisNexis, 2004), p. 135; Christophe Geiger, Author’s Right, Copyright and the
Public’s Right to Information: A Complex Relationship, in: Fiona Macmillan (ed.), New
Directions in Copyright Law, Vol. 5 (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2007), 24-44.
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Cf. CJEU, Judgment of 12.06.2003, Schmidberger, Case C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333,
paras. 78-80; this wide margin of discretion afforded to the Member States has a long
tradition in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, see only ECtHR (Plenary), 7 December
1976, case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 5493/72, paras. 48-49,
ECtHR (5th section), 10 January 2013, case of Ashby Donald and other v. France, Appl.
no. 36769/08, para. 39 and ECtHR (5th section) of 19 February 2013, case of Fredrik
Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl. nr. 40397/12, under
D.
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information that is subject to the exercise of the right to freedom of
expression.87
In Mc Fadden, in which the Court assessed the compatibility of
several measures to ensure the unavailability of infringing content on a
wireless network available to the public on the premises of a shop dealing
in musical equipment, the essence of the right to freedom of information
was found not to be undermined. In coming to that conclusion, the Court
considered that the measure taken was the protection of the network by
means of a password, and it also considered that other possibilities to gain
access to the internet existed.88 The Court found a strictly targeted
measure solely aimed at terminating infringing activity proportionate,
provided that other users of the access provider installing such a measure
could continue to lawfully access information. If lawful access to
information were to be disabled through blocking or filtering measure of
an access provider, an interference with the right to freedom of
information, as an expression of Article 11 EUCFR, would have been
unjustified.89 Similarly, the ECtHR in its recent ruling in Kharitonov v.
Russia argued that the blocking of websites by a state agency that contain
illegal content must be strictly targeted and any collateral blocking of
lawful content is likely to violate the right to freedom of expression.90
Another fundamental right which is potentially affected by copyright
enforcement measures is the freedom of artistic creativity. The right to
artistic freedom is protected under the umbrella of Article 10 ECHR and
by Article 13 EUCFR. While the notion of ‘the arts’ has been defined
neither by the ECtHR, nor by the CJEU, it is considered to be a broad
notion covering all forms of artistic expression, including musical and
visual art.91 According to the ECtHR “[F]reedom of artistic expression
[…] affords the opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural,
political and social information and ideas of all kinds […]. Those who
create, perform, distribute or exhibit works of art contribute to the
exchange of ideas and opinions which is essential for a democratic
society. Hence there is an obligation on the State not to encroach unduly
on the author’s freedom of expression […].”92 The distribution or
87

In Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, the ECtHR stated for
example that the protection under Article 10 ECHR granted to the information, mainly
unlawful copies of music and films, disseminated via the service operated by the
applicants could not enjoy the same level of protection as political expression and debate,
ECtHR (5th section) of 19 February 2013, case of Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde
Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl. nr. 40397/12, under D, see also ECtHR
(5th section), 10 January 2013, case of Ashby Donald and other v. France, Appl. no.
36769/08, para. 39.
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CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 92.
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CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 93, see also CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien,
para. 56.
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ECtHR (Third Section) of 23 June 2020, case of Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia, Appl.
no. 10795/14, para. 46.; See also Elena Izyumenko, European Court of Human Rights
rules that collateral website blocking violates freedom of expression, 15(10) Journal of
Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2020), 774-775, p. 775.
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Debbie Sayers, in: Peers, Hervey, Kenner, & Ward, 2014, para. 13.48.
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exhibition of artistic creation online is therefore also protected and there
is an obligation on the legislator not to restrict it unduly with copyright
law.93 Member states enjoy a certain margin of discretion and the
Strasbourg Court usually focuses on whether the interference was
necessary and pursued a pressing social need.94
In relation to the protection of individuals the ECtHR exercises
restraint. In Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria,95 the Court ruled
a prohibition to display a painting that allegedly undermined the public
standing of an individual to be in violation of Article 10 ECHR. The
purpose of the injunction ordered by the Austrian Court was not to protect
public morals but to protect the rights of an individual person, moreover
for an unlimited period of time. Accordingly, restrictions to the right to
artistic freedom have to be interpreted restrictively.
Aside from the incentive provided by the grant of an exclusive right
for intellectual creations, the use of existing works in the creation of new
works is of fundamental importance. Although CJEU has recently
rejected an external restriction of copyright by the right to free artistic
expression,96 copyright includes mechanisms that enable derived
creativity.97 The court specifically referred, on the basis of the InfoSoc
Directive, to the exclusive rights of Article 2-4, the exceptions and
limitations contained in Article 5(1)-(4) and the three-step test of Article
5(5). In his YouTube Opinion, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe also warned that
a general monitoring and filtering obligation would not only be contrary
to Article 11 EUCFR, since it would restrict access to information, but it
would also “introduce a risk of undermining online creativity and “that
maximum protection of certain forms of intellectual creativity is to the
detriment of other forms of creativity which are also positive for

40287/98, para. 42.
93
See more generally on this topic, Christophe Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity
and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination, 8(3) UC Irvine Law Review (2018),
413-458; Christophe Geiger, Copyright and the Freedom to Create, A Fragile Balance,
38(6) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 707 (2007);
Christophe Geiger, When Freedom of Artistic Expression allows Creative
Appropriations and Opens up Statutory Copyright Limitations, in: Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Ng-Loy Wee Loon, & Haochen Sun (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021)
p. 174.
94
ECtHR, (1988), para. 32.
95
ECtHR (First Section), 25 January 2008, case of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v.
Austria, Appl. no. 68354/01, para. 31.
96
See CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, paras. 34-39.
97
More generally the CJEU has argued with reference not only to artistic creation, that
copyright, as harmonized at EU level, represent a fair balance between the various rights
and interest affected, see CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, paras. 59-62, CJEU,
Judgment of 29.07.2019, Spiegel Online, Case C-516/17, EU:C:2019:625, paras. 43-46
and CJEU, C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW, paras. 57-61. On these decisions see
Christophe Geiger, & Elena Izyumenko, The Constitutionalization of Intellectual
Property Law in the EU and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions
of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some Way to Go!, 51(3) International Review of
Intellectual Property and Competition (2020), 282-306.
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society.”98 In this regard the importance of the way art is communicated
must be highlighted. In particular, modern forms of creative digital
expression are predominantly disseminated to an audience via online
platforms, such as those subject to regulation under Article 17 CDSM
Directive.99 The regulation of dissemination channels can therefore
constitute a restriction on the right to artistic freedom, which requires
justification.100
2. Freedom to conduct a business
The freedom to conduct a business, together with the freedom to
choose an occupation and to engage in work (Article 15) and the right to
property (Article 17), is one of the three economic FR of the EUCFR. It
serves to guarantee the freedom of entrepreneurs and reflects the EU’s
principle of an open market economy with free competition.101 Its scope
is broad and covers every economic activity and guarantees the right of a
business to dispose freely of its resources of an economic, technical and
financial character.102 Its scope also includes the right of an undertaking
to choose with whom to enter into a contract, or in general, with whom to
do business.103
Due to its broad scope, the freedom to conduct a business is easily
affected by national measures and regulatory interventions. Therefore, the
proportionality analysis carries particular importance in the context of
Article 16 EUCFR and is not barred by a positive finding that the essence
of the respective fundamental right remains intact.104
The Court of Justice has been largely supportive of commercial
intermediaries and shielded them from excessive obligations. In Sabam v
Netlog it argued that a “a complicated, costly, permanent computer
system” solely at the expense of the intermediary constitutes a significant
infringement of the FR of a hosting provider. The imposition of such a
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Martin Senftleben, Bermuda Triangle—Licensing, Filtering and Privileging UserGenerated Content Under the New Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market,
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100
Cf. Henrike Maier, Remixe auf Hosting-Plattformen: Eine urheberrechtliche
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Inhaltefiltern (Internet und Gesellschaft, Band 11), Mohr Siebeck, (Tübingen, 2018), p.
175; see also Hans D. Jarass, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 2020),
Art. 13, para. 11.
101
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Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, (Cheltenham, Northampton:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 410-420.
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CJEU, Judgment of 10.07.2013, Case C-426/11, EU:C:2013:521, para. 32 and CJEU,
C-283/11 Sky Österreich, paras. 42-43.
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Cf. CJEU, C-283/11 Sky Österreich, paras. 46-68; here the CJEU examined whether
the measure was proportionate after it had established that the essence of the freedom to
conduct a business has not been affected.
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system would not strike a fair balance between the property interests of
rightholders and the business interest of a hosting provider.105 The
ramifications of large-scale filtering on the economic viability of platform
services was appreciated by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in YouTube.
Especially smaller platforms would encounter financial difficulties when
fulfilling a broad obligation to keep infringing material off their
services.106
In other situations, the CJEU has been more lenient to allow
restrictions of the freedom to conduct a business. In Sky Österreich, the
CJEU examined a provision of Directive 2010/13 which obliged Member
States to foresee in their national laws a rule under which broadcasters
can gain access to broadcasts transmitted on an exclusive basis on a fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory manner in order to report on events of
high interest to the public in the context of short news reports.107 In
balancing Article 16 with Article 17 EUCFR, the Court found that the
interference with the freedom to conduct a business by the obligation for
broadcasters to make their exclusive broadcasts accessible was
proportionate. The Court highlighted that the conditions under which
access to exclusive broadcasts could be gained by other broadcasters were
clearly determined and Article 15 AVMSD did not prevent rightholders
from charging fees for such access, 108 thereby cushioning the effects of
the restriction to the freedom to conduct a business. In this case, however
the restrictions were clearly set out in the harmonizing legislation and the
restrictions were relatively light.
In two cases relating to access providers, the CJEU further determined
the parameters for interferences with the freedom to conduct a business
in the context of monitoring and blocking information. In Mc Fadden, it
clarified that a requirement which obliged an access provider to
marginally adjust the technical options available to him would not go as
far as to encroach upon the very essence of the freedom to conduct a
business.109 But in this case the measure requested seemed absolutely
necessary to protect the essence of another fundamental right, which in
turn justified a moderate restriction of the Article 16 right;110 however, an
obligation to monitor internet traffic was clearly rejected in this case. In
UPC Telekabel, the Court determined that a court injunction that ordered
an access provider to block access to a specific website did not infringe
the very substance of the fundamental right. Although the measure might
represent a significant cost for the access provider, the fact that the choice
105
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of which measure to implement to achieve a particular outcome was left
to the service provider, taking account its capacities, weighed in favour
of an appropriate balance.111 However, the Court also stressed that the
access provider must be able to demonstrate before a court, in order to
avoid liability, that it has taken all reasonable measures. This would
safeguard compliance with the principle of legal certainty and give the
access provider the opportunity to ensure full compliance with the
injunction.112 In his Opinion in Mc Fadden, AG Szpunar argued that an
injunction that leaves the choice of measures to be taken entirely to the
intermediary could constitute a source of legal uncertainty, even if the
appropriateness of such measures would be reviewable by the courts. An
injunction formulated in general and vague terms would, therefore, not
always succeed in striking a fair balance between the rights and interests
involved.113
Intermediaries must therefore be able to rely on sufficiently defined
laws clearly set out what actions have to be taken to avoid liability.
Similarly, overly cost-intensive measures are more likely to restrict
Article 16 EUCFR to an extent that cannot be justified with reference to
competing FR. The CJEU has permitted significant restrictions to the
freedom to conduct a business only when strictly necessary and provided
that the economic impact on the service provider is not disproportionate.
This reflects a trend in the case-law of the CJEU that does not seem to
support a position that would oblige platform operators to function as
general private copyright enforcers. Also, with regard to the criteria set
by the Court in UPC Telekabel, a provision setting obligations that would
leave the intermediaries no other choice but to implement automated
filtering systems to be effective would also likely be considered a
disproportionate restriction to the freedom to conduct business.
3. Data protection, privacy and family life
The right to private life and the right to data protection are protected
by Article 7 and 8 EUCFR respectively. Both Charter rights are based on
Article 8 of the ECHR which protects the right to respect for private and
family life.114 The right to data protection has further been given
expression in secondary legislation by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data.115 Article 7 in particular also
111
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protects the right to respect for communications, which includes private
and commercial communications.116
The right to data protection can potentially enter into conflict with
several other FR, especially within the context of secondary EU
legislation.117 In relation to copyright the conflicts with the right to
property and the right to an effective remedy are most pronounced. While
the CJEU tends to avoid giving substantive guidance,118 the legislation
itself is indicative of the balance between Article 7 and 8 EUCFR and
Article 17(2) and Article 47.119 The large-scale analysis of information
uploaded onto a hosting service has been ruled to be incompatible with
Article 15(1) ECD, which prohibits Member States to oblige service
providers to monitor information transmitted via, or stored on their
service.120 To that effect, the CJEU underlined in Scarlet Extended that a
general obligation to filter for infringing content would infringe the right
to protection of personal data.121 This is because the automated filtering
of information and its use to identify infringers will inevitably lead to the
processing of personal data and would enable the identification of
individual users.122
The CJEU allows Member States a certain flexibility in designing
their national laws to strike the balance between the right to property and
the right to data protection. An illustration of the flexibility the Court
affords to Member States are the Promusicae123 and Bonnier Audio124
rulings of the CJEU. While in the former, the Court argued that EU law
did not require that access providers must provide users data in civil
proceedings, it considered national legislation that required the disclosure
of user data in civil proceedings “likely, in principle” to strike a fair
balance between the FR concerned.125 In L’Oréal v. eBay, the Court
added, that in order to identify infringers on an online marketplace it must
be possible to clearly identify infringers operating in the course of
trade.126 However, in either situation, the interpretation and application of
national law must ensure that a fair balance is struck and, in particular,
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the right to privacy is respected.127
The cases illustrate, however, the Court’s great caution to limit the
rights of individual internet users too easily. In two cases it only permitted
remedies that would infringe upon the rights of users because the right to
property would otherwise have been impacted in its very core. This was
the case in Mc Fadden, where the CJEU allowed a national court to order
a small business to protect its wireless network with a password as one of
only three options suggested by the national court to provide the
rightholder with an effective remedy.128 In his Opinion in Mc Fadden, AG
Szpunar rejected this option based on concerns for the protection of
personal data.129 Similarly, in Bastei Lübbe, the Court allowed the
identification of close relatives only because the rightholder would have
been left without any other possibility to enforce his rights. It stated
expressly that an absolute protection of the right to family life cannot be
granted if this makes the enforcement of intellectual property rights
impossible.130 Finally, with reference to the right to the protection of
personal data, the Court applied a restrictive interpretation to the term
‘address’ to exclude a user’s email address, telephone number and IPaddress.131
The Courts positioning of the right to privacy and related FR display
a high degree of restraint. A careful reading of the jurisprudence indicates
that the rights under Article 7 and 8 EUCFR can only be limited to enable
the enforcement of copyright under strict conditions, and often only when
a restriction is necessary to preserve the essence of the right to property.132
This leaves room for the assumption that the processing of data of
individuals, and certainly its disclosure, constitutes restrictions to Articles
7 and 8 EUCFR that are very difficult to justify.
4. The right to property and its social function
The right to property is guaranteed by Article 1, First Protocol to the
127
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ECHR and Article 17(2) EUCFR. Whereas the former does not expressly
mention intellectual property but guarantees the “peaceful enjoyment of
(…) possessions”133, the latter simply states that “[i]ntellectual property
shall be protected”. 134 However, under both FR regimes, the right to
property can be limited. The ECHR foresees that “[n]o one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest” and any
interference with the right to property must be provided for by law.135
Furthermore, states cannot be prevented from enforcing laws that control
the use of property in the public interest. In more general terms, Article
51 EUCFR states that “[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and
freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.”
Accordingly, the right to property is not an absolute right and can be
subject to restrictions.136 In YouTube, AG Saugmansgaard Øe stated that
the exclusive right of communication to the public of Article 3(1) InfoSoc
Directive “does not necessarily have to be interpreted in a manner which
ensures maximum protection for rightholders.”137 In a similar vein, the
133
The inclusion of intellectual property into the scope of Article 1 of the First Protocol
to the ECHR has been confirmed, among others, in ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 16 June
2015, case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, Appl. no. 64569/09, ECtHR (5th section), 10 January
2013, case of Ashby Donald and other v. France, Appl. no. 36769/08 and ECtHR (Grand
Chamber) of 11 January 2007, case of Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, Appl. no.
73049/01.
134
For a comment of this unclear provision see Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property
shall be protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union: a mysterious provision with an unclear scope, 31(3) European Intellectual
Property Review (2009), 113-117, para. 116 and Jonathan Griffiths, & Luke McDonagh,
Fundamental rights and European IP law: the case of Art 17(2) of the EU Charter, in:
Christopher Geiger (ed.), Constructing European Intellectual Property: Achievements
and New Perspectives, (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 7593; Alain Strowel, Copyright strengthened by the Court of Justice interpretation of
Article 17(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in: Oreste Pollicino, Giovanni
Maria Riccio and Marco Bassini (eds.), Copyright and Fundamental Rights in the Digital
Age, A Comparative Analysis in Search of a Common Constitutional Ground,
(Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), p. 28.
135
Article 1(1), First Protocol to the ECHR.
136
See e.g. CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, para. 33; CJEU, C-469/17 Funke
Medien NRW para. 72; CJEU, C-516/17 Spiegel Online, para. 56; CJEU, C-484/14 Mc
Fadden, para. 90; CJEU, C-160/15 GS Media, para. 45; CJEU, Judgment of 03.09.2014,
Deckmyn, Case C-201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, para. 26; CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel
Wien, paras. 46-47; CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, paras. 41-42; CJEU, C-70/10
Scarlet Extended, para. 44; CJEU, C-275/06 Promusicae, para. 65.
137
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, paras. 238-239. In a footnote (n. 221)
the AG suggests that in the absence of full and maximum protection, which seems to
suggest that rightholders must expect to be exposed to certain infringements, it can be
expected that they undertake their own efforts to help remedying infringements,
including collaboration with platform operators. A similar approach was taken by the
CJEU in the factually very different case FAPL/Murphy when it stated that “the specific
subject-matter of intellectual property does not guarantee the right holders concerned the
opportunity to demand the highest possible remuneration.”, CJEU, Judgment of
4.10.2011, FAPL/Murphy, Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, EU:C:2011:631, para.
108; the AG had argued on the principle of legal certainty that rightholders cannot object
to the importation of foreign TV decoders in order to maintain different pricing models
for live football subscriptions across the EU Member States, partially because the

33

CJEU limited the scope of the related right of phonogram producers in
Pelham by arguing that users, in exercising their FR to artistic expression,
do not perform an act of reproduction in relation to a protected phonogram
if the sample taken from that phonogram is unrecognizable to the ear once
it has been integrated into a new work.138 What is protected is the essence
of the right, and only a very serious infringement of the property right
might possibly not strike a fair balance between the FR concerned. 139
In its early case-law on the free movement of goods the CJEU has
recognized the necessity to limit the exercise of intellectual property
rights in order to ensure the functioning of the internal market. In
Deutsche Grammophon, the Court established that the manufacturer of a
phonogram could not rely on its right to distribution to prevent the sale in
another Member State of copies of a phonogram which has been lawfully
marketed in another Member State.140 It thereby rejected the possibility
to justify a restriction to the free movement of goods on the ground of the
protection of industrial and commercial property, which would only be
possible in order to protect “right which constitute the essential subjectmatter of such property.”141
According to the Court in Mc Fadden, measures to protect the right to
property, e.g. by way of an injunction that would oblige an intermediary
to terminate or prevent an infringement of copyright, must nevertheless
be effective in preventing unauthorized access, or at least make access
more difficult to access such content to the effect that users become
discouraged.142
In any case, the third sentence of article 17(1) CFREU provides that
property can be limited in the general interest.143 Undoubtedly, this
restriction also applies to intellectual property. Arguably, intellectual
property, which is separately mentioned in paragraph 2 by a relatively
blunt declaration, could be limited even further to give expression to its
inherent social function.144
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5. The right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
The right to an effective remedy and a fair trial is guaranteed by
Article 47 EUCFR and Article 6(1) ECHR.145 Its scope is wide, and
comes into play, in principle, whenever the Charter applies in order to
guarantee the substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed therein.146 It
also applies in disputes between individuals in relation to rights granted
under EU law.147 In the context of platform liability, three aspects of
Article 47 are of particular importance. First, the right to an effective
remedy carries importance for rightholders who want to have recourse to
redress mechanisms if their rights are infringed online. Second, users
should have access to complaints and redress mechanisms in order to
ensure the exercise of their rights. And third, both rightholders and users
must have access to the possibility of having their claims reviewed by a
competent judicial authority.148
Users of platforms must be able to rely on their FR to freedom of
expression and freedom of the arts to perform certain acts online.
Automated enforcement by way of monitoring and filtering cannot only
limit these rights, but a failure to make effective complaints mechanisms
available can also restrict the right to an effective remedy. Therefore, as a
first step, limitations to these rights, even if effected by private parties
such as OCSSPs, must be subject to appropriate review.149 Appropriate in
this context should mean, review by a competent court,150 as opposed to
quasi adjudication by private operators.151
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In substance, the right to an effective remedy requires that users can
rely on a dispute settlement mechanism that provides them with an
impartial forum which deals with their complaint efficiently and
expeditiously.152 As much as preventive blocking of content restricts the
right to freedom of expression, as much is a delay in reinstating lawful
content harmful. This suggest that proceedings before national courts
might not be the best option to effectively an expeditiously handle user
complaints.153 However, such complaints should not necessarily be
handled by OCSSPs, which will have their own, reasonably justified
interests in designing automated enforcement as efficiently as possible.
Users must have access to an impartial forum that provides them with a
quick and impartial procedure.154 The CDSM Directive mandates out-ofcourt dispute settlement mechanism for users redress and complaints.155
Indeed, a properly designed alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
infrastructure would be best placed to ensure user’s right to an effective
remedy.156
Member States are under an obligation to provide remedies to protect
natural and legal persons against “any provision of a national legal system
and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair
the effectiveness” of EU law.157 Accordingly, in Mc Fadden, the Court
ruled that rightholders must have access to a remedy to enforce their rights
against potential infringers, but also by way of injunction to order an
intermediary to terminate and prevent future infringements.158 This was
further stressed in Bastei Lübbe, when the Court argued that the right to
private life cannot be used to shield a family member from liability for
copyright infringement if the rightholder would be left without an
effective remedy, therefore robbing the right to property of its very
Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
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enforcement institutions to private law enforcement and adjudication powers exercised
by a few privately operated platforms.
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essence.159 In a balance between various FR, the right to an effective
remedy cannot be entirely ignored. On the contrary, if necessary, other
FR can be limited in order to ensure the proper enforcement of rights
granted under EU law. As demonstrated above, the right to an effective
remedy is not absolute and the cases in which the court argued in its
favour were based on very specific fact patterns.160
The right to an effective judicial remedy, therefore, has two important
dimensions in relation to platform liability. One institutional, which
should guarantee users and rightholder access to public law enforcement
or at least impartial and independent adjudication authority, which can
provide remedies to mitigate harm caused by third parties. And a
procedural dimension, which should provide effectively and
expeditiously for redress to compensate for harm caused and, more
importantly, for injunctions that can prevent future harm from
manifesting itself.
Legal Certainty and market harmonization
The general principle of legal certainty and the structural aim of
effective market harmonization have been considered by the CJEU in the
context of the ‘fair balance’ of copyright.
Legal certainty “requires that legal rules be clear and precise and aims
to ensure that situations and legal relationships governed by Community
law remain foreseeable”161 and “that Community rules enable those
concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are
imposed on them”.162 The aim to establish an internal market is set out in
Articles 3(3) TEU and 26 TFEU and given effect in the competence norm,
of Article 114 TFEU.
The CJEU discussed both principles in Pelham when it rejected the
possibility to create exceptions or limitations beyond the list of Article 5
InfoSoc Directive. It argued that the creation of new copyright rules solely
based on FR would jeopardize the aim effective market harmonization,
which pursues the objective of creating legal certainty.163 This
demonstrates that the former is a function of the latter and should ensure
that diverging national rules in the Member States of the EU do not
constitute barriers to intra-community trade.
The principle of legal certainty further mandates that rules are
sufficiently clear and precise, a requirement which is not connected to the
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aim of market harmonization. In this context, legal certainty requires that
an economic actor can plan his actions in reliance on the law so as to avoid
incurring liability. This was highlighted in UPC Telekabel when the Court
argued that the addressee of an injunction must be able to foresee and
ascertain, before incurring any penalty, whether he has taken all necessary
measures to comply with his obligations.164 However, the Court did not
exclude the possibility of an injunction that specifies an outcome but
leaves the choice of specific measures to the addressee of an injunction.165
Interim conclusions
The balancing of FR in relation to online copyright enforcement
demonstrates a reluctance on part of the CJEU to give priority to property
protection over other important FR. It becomes apparent that the legal
framework that provides rightholders with enforcement tools needs to be
respectful of the FR of others, restrictions to which must be always strictly
scrutinized. Although the Court does not determine the balance to be
struck with finality, it has provided guidelines with which domestic court
have to apply national transpositions of the EU rules. With respect to the
new liability mechanism for OCSSPs, which will be further described and
analyzed below, it must be borne in mind that the right of users and
platform operators, the right to privacy and freedom of expression, the
right to due process and to an effective remedy, and the freedom to
conduct a business respectively, have to be taken seriously and that any
platform liability must be implemented in compliance with a fair balance
of the rights involved166. No matter how legitimate the enforcement of
exclusive rights protected by copyright law is in the online world, it
cannot result in significant and disproportionate infringements of the
rights of others and rightholders cannot expect to be treated more
favorably than users and platform operators. Therefore, any liability
regime for platforms must be designed in a FR-compliant manner and
safeguards must be included to make FR a reality in its practical
implementation.

EXAMINING ARTICLE 17 CDSM IN THE LIGHT OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS

The new liability regime established by Article 17 CDSM creates
significant FR overlaps. Before addressing these conflicts and assessing
the balancing mechanisms offered by Article 17 it is instrumental to
briefly examine its relevant provisions in more detail.
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The new liability regime established by Art 17 CSDM – An
overview
Article 17 CDSM creates a new liability regime for OCSSPs.167 An
OCSSP is “a provider of an information society service of which the main
or one of the main purposes is to store and give the public access to a large
amount of copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter
uploaded by its users, which it organises and promotes for profit-making
purposes.”168
Article 17(1) provides that OCSSPs perform acts of communication
to the public or making available when their users upload content
protected by copyright.169 For these acts, they should obtain
authorizations from rightholders. Such authorizations, e.g. by way of
167
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See in this regard AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, in which the AG seems
to suggest that Article 17(1) defines by way of non-retroactive extension the right of
communication to the public sector-specifically.
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licenses, will cover acts of communication to the public performed by the
users of OCSSPs.170 Accordingly, Article 17 derogates from the hosting
safe harbour under Article 14(1) ECD with regard to OCSSPs.171
Article 17(1) and (4) are systematically linked, whereby the former
establishes primary liability for acts of communication to the public
jointly committed by the OCSSP and its users, which morphs into
secondary liability if the OCSSP has failed to obtain the necessary
licenses.172 It is here that the conflicts between the various FR erupt most
apparently.
If OCSSPs do not, or are not able to, obtain an authorization, they are
directly liable for unauthorized acts of communication to the public,
including the making available to the public.173 However, OCSSPs can
escape liability under two cumulative conditions: first, an OCSSP must
demonstrate that it has undertaken “best efforts”174 to obtain
authorization;175 second, it must have made “in accordance with high
industry standards of professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the
unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for which the
rightholders have provided the service providers with the relevant and
necessary information”.176 In any case, upon receiving sufficient
substantiated notice from the rightholder, an OCSSPs must act
expeditiously “to disable access to, or to remove from their websites, the
notified works or other subject matter, and [make] best efforts to prevent
their future uploads”.177 These new obligations constitute a fundamental
shift in the EU’s approach to intermediary lability from ‘notice and take
down’ to ‘notice and stay-down’.178 However, Art. 17(8) makes it very
170

Article 17(2) CDSM Directive.
Article 17(3) CDSM Directive: “When an online content-sharing service provider
performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the
public under the conditions laid down in this Directive, the limitation of liability
established in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC shall not apply to the situations
covered by this Article”.
172
Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 12.
173
Article 17(4), first sentence CDSM Directive.
174
Differences in the translation of the “best efforts” standards have been highlighted by
Rosati, DSM Directive Series #5: Does the DSM Directive mean the same thing in all
language versions? The case of ‘best efforts’ in Article 17(4)(a), available at:
https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/05/dsm-directive-series-5-does-dsm.html, accessed:
25.01.2021, for a comprehensive study on the linguistic variations of Article 17(4)(a)
see Larroyed, When Translations Shape Legal Systems: How Misguided Translations
Impact Users and Lead to Inaccurate Transposition – The Case of ‘Best Efforts’ Under
Article 17 DCDSM, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?, who warns
that differences in national translations can seriously jeopardize the purpose of achieving
harmonization.
175
Article 17(4)(a) CDSM Directive.
176
Article 17(4)(b) CDSM Directive.
177
Article 17(4)(c) CDSM Directive.
178
Reda et al. (2020), p. 8; Schwemer, & Schovsbo, What is Left of User Rights? –
Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement and Free Speech in the Light of the Article 17
Regime in: Torremans (2020), p. 586; Kuczerawy, From ‘Notice and Takedown’ to
‘Notice and Stay Down’: Risks and Safeguards for Freedom of Expression in: Frosio
(2020); see in general Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64(5) UCLA Law Review
(2017), 1082-1100, p. 1093, who addressed the phenomenon that a shift to algorithmic
171
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clear that these new obligations should not lead to duty for OCSSPs to
install general filtering systems that would monitor all uploads in a
general manner.179
To determine whether OCSSPs comply with their obligations under
Article 17(4), certain factors must be taken into consideration and be
assessed in the light of the principle of proportionality. The relevant
factors are “the type, the audience and the size of the service and the type
of works or other subject matter uploaded by the users of the service”180
and “the availability of suitable and effective means and their cost for
service providers.”181 In addition, specific new OCSSPs do not incur all
obligations under Article 17(4).182
The interests of users of services that come within the scope of Article
17 are reflected in Article 17(7) and (9). The former provides that the
cooperation between rightholders and OCSSPs defined in Article 17(4)
shall not prevent the availability of lawful content uploaded by users.183
Paragraph 7 makes express reference to uses subject to exceptions and
limitations, and further stipulates that exceptions for quotation, criticism
and review as well as those for the purpose of caricature, parody or
pastiche must be available for users to rely on. As for the use on online
platforms that qualify as OCSSPs, these exceptions are mandatory.184
The obligation for OCSSPs arising under Article 17(4) and the right
of users expressed in Article 17(7) create an internal conflict within the
systematic structure of Article 17.185 The resolution of practical conflicts
enforcement has led to a shift in the balance in copyright.
179
Article 17(8) CDSM Directive.
180
Article 17(5)(a) CDSM Directive.
181
Article 17(5)(b) CDSM Directive.
182
New OCSSPs which are available to the public in the EU for less than three years and
which have a turnover of less than EUR 10 million must only comply with Article
17(4)(a) and are required to remove or disable access to infringing works or other subject
matter upon notification (Article 17(4)(c), first sentence). Such OCSSPs with more than
5 million visitors per year must also undertake best efforts to ensure the further
unavailability of notified works and subject matter (Article 17(4)(c), second sentence).
183
See very clearly in this sense, with references to the protection of the FR of the users,
Recital 70 of the CDSM Directive.
184
See Recital 70 of the CDSM Directive, stating that “those exceptions and limitations
should (…) be made mandatory in order to ensure that users receive uniform protection
across the Union”. On this issue see Quintais et al., JIPITEC (2019), pp. 278-279;
Krzystof Garstka, Guiding the Blind Bloodhonds: How to Mitigate the Risks Article 17
of Directive 2019/970 Poses to the Freedom on Expression, in: Paul Torremans (ed.),
Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
International, 2020), 327-352, p. 335. Under the central norm that harmonized
exceptions and limitation to the exclusive rights of copyright in the EU, all but one
exception or limitation are options, see Article 5(2) and (3) InfoSoc Directive.
185
See e.g. Pamela Samuelson, Pushing Back on Stricter Copyright ISP Liability Rules,
Michigan Technology Law Review, Forthcoming, available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3630700 (2020), p. 14; the obligation to ensure that users can
perform lawful uses is extremely difficult to realize considering the obligation to ensure
that unlawful uploads must be prevented. The differentiation between lawful and
unlawful uses, especially in cases of context-contingent uses under copyright exceptions,
is impossible to make with automated means. See in this sense Christophe Geiger, The
artificial intelligence and data-led revolution of copyright and its wider implications,
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between these two provisions is anticipated in Article 17(9), which
requires Member States to provide that OCSSP put in place effective and
expeditious complaint and redress mechanisms which users can avail
themselves of in case access to works uploaded by them is disabled or
when they have been removed.186 OCSSPs must process user requests
without undue delay and a decision to disable access or remove content
must be subject to human review. Out-of-court redress mechanisms must
also be made available, without depriving users of access to effective
judicial remedies.187 Article 17(9) reiterates that the Directive should in
no way affect legitimate uses, including such under exceptions and
limitations and that personal data shall only be processed in accordance
with Directive 2002/58/EC188 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR).
While Article 17(7) is formulated as an absolute standard (“shall not
result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter
uploaded by users“), Article 17(4) is based on a relative “best efforts”
obligation.189 Furthermore, the Directive requires that OCSSPS inform
users in their terms and conditions that they are permitted to use works or
protected subject matter under exceptions and limitations.
Finally, the Directive specifies that a stakeholder dialogue should
explore best practices for the cooperation between OCSSPs and
rightholders.190
Article 17, Automated filtering and fundamental rights
Article 17 foresees that OCSSPS ensure the unavailability of certain
works on their platforms without, however, indicating how this should be
Digital Encounters, Final report p. 5, underlining the “unsolvable conflict” between Art
17
(4)
and
17
(8)
CDSM,
available
at:
https://www.fidefundacion.es/docs/GlobalDigitalEncounters/Encounter_8_Report_Fin
al.pdf
186
According to Garstka, these procedures were put in place by the drafters of the
directive “to mitigate the damage to Freedom of expression” created by Article 17
CSDM Directive: Garstka, Guiding the Blind Bloodhonds: How to Mitigate the Risks
Article 17 of Directive 2019/970 Poses to the Freedom of Expression in: Torremans
(2020), p. 335.
187
The provision again makes reference to exception and limitations, which users should
be able to assert before a court of law, or another judicial authority.
188
Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer
programs, OJ L 122, 17.05.1991, p. 42-46 (Software Directive).
189
This seems to establish a hierarchy between Art. 17(7) and 17(4), which was
confirmed by the European Commission during the hearing before the CJEU in the
context of the Polish challenge of Art. 17 (see Keller, CJEU hearing in the Polish
challenge to Article 17: Not even the supporters of the provision agree on how it should
work, available at: http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/11/11/cjeu-hearing-inthe-polish-challenge-to-article-17-not-even-the-supporters-of-the-provision-agree-onhow-it-should-work/, accessed: 25.01.2021).
190
The stakeholder dialogue, which included not only representatives from OCSSPs and
rightholders, but also users’ organizations fed into the drafting of guidelines on the
application of Article 17. The mandate for the stakeholder dialogue underlined that
account shall be taken of “the need to balance fundamental rights and of the use of
exceptions and limitations” (Article 17(10) CDSM Directive).
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achieved. When fulfilling their obligation OCSSPs must be careful not to
restrict their users in lawfully sharing and accessing information. At the
same time, platform operators should not be obliged to explore the limits
of the economic viability of their business models to ensure that the rights
of rightholders are effectively enforced. The balance between the
different FR that are reflected in these interests is thus largely dependent
on the technological solutions that OCSSPS will employ to discharge
their obligations.
1. Automated filtering as a necessary consequence of Article 17
Article 17 requires that works or other subject matter for which
rightholders have provided the relevant and necessary information should
not be accessible. The provision must be read together with the obligation
under Article 17(1) and the first condition to avoid liability under Article
17(4)(a). Accordingly, OCSSPs must ensure the unavailability of content
which is protected by copyright or related rights for which it has not or
could not acquire a license. Rightholders must cooperate with OCSSPs
by providing the relevant information in relation to such works, so that
platform operators can comply with their obligations. How and to which
extent this information is provided will have significant ramifications for
the obligation to ensure unavailability of the works concerned.191
To some extent, either preventively or as a reaction to prior
infringements, OCSSPs will have to monitor and filter specific works
automatically. Senftleben and Angelopuolos argue that Article 17 does not
require OCSSPs to engage in automated monitoring of all content notified
by rightholders.192 More targeted options, such as takedown-models
including suspension of user accounts could be considered, among other

191

The most likely scenario is that if rightholders, for various reasons, will not grant
authorization for specific works or types of works OCSSPs would be provided with long
lists of works and their respective data, see e.g. Gerald Spindler, The Liability system of
Art. 17 DSMD and national implementation – contravening prohibition of general
monitoring duties?, 10(3) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and
E-Commerce Law (2019), 344-374, p. 356 and Reda et al. (2020), p. 15. In relation to
these works OCSSPS would then have to ensure that any upload will be unsuccessful in
order to comply with the condition of Article 17(4)(b) and (c). It should be qualified that
the condition of Article 17(4)(c) only applies in cases in which content has been uploaded
before and has been notified by the rightholder (cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN
(October 2020), p. 31). However, as we have seen, subparagraph (c) requires not only a
takedown upon notification but, an obligation for the OCSSP to ensure the future
unavailability (so-called “staydown”) of the notified content in accordance with the
mechanisms of subparagraph (b).
192
The authors recall three interpretations of what constitutes ‘general monitoring: (1) a
basic interpretation which defines general monitoring as a situation in which all content
of a platform is monitored, even if only in relation to specific works; (2) a situation in
which monitoring of all content is permitted in relation to specific infringements
pursuant to a court order, and (3) a situation in which monitoring of all content is
permitted in relation to specific infringements pursuant to a court order notification by,
for example, the rightholder; Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), pp. 89.
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options.193 The automated filtering of at least some content seems to be
unavoidable for OCSSPs, even if in combination with other nonautomated mechanisms.
2. Does automated filtering qualify as general monitoring? (Article
17(8))
The Directive is very clear in this respect: The fulfilment of the ‘best
efforts’ obligation arising under Article 17(4) shall not lead to a general
monitoring obligation.194 As we have seen, a general obligation to
monitor for information society service providers (ISSP) has been ruled
out by the CJEU, most prominently in Scarlet Extended195 and Netlog.196
The Court argued in both cases that such an obligation imposed on ISSPs
by way of an injunction would conflict with various FR, including the
right to receive or impart information, the right to protection of personal
data and the freedom to conduct a business.197
In L’Oréal v eBay, the CJEU stated that an intermediary cannot be
expected to engage in “active monitoring of all the data of each of its
customers in order to prevent any future infringement”. Such an
obligation would be in violation of Article 15(1) ECD.198 Moreover,
Article 3 of Directive on the enforcement of intellectual Property Rights
(‘IPRED’)199 provides that “measures, procedures and remedies shall be
fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly“.
This in itself is an expression of a balance that is informed by
proportionality.

193

However, the suspension of user accounts, as only one example, must also be
considered against the applicable FR, most notably the right to freedom of expression
and artistic freedom, and therefore should be ultima ratio for repeat- or high volumeinfringers.
194
Article 17(8) CDSM Directive.
195
CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended.
196
CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog.
197
A balancing of these rights of users of online services and the right of service
providers against the right to intellectual property would not justify the imposition of a
general filtering or monitoring obligation, see CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended, paras.
41-54 and CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, paras. 39-52.
198
Article 17(3) exempts the application of Article 14(1) ECD within the scope of Article
17 CDSM, which means that the category of intermediaries that qualify as OCSSPS
cannot rely on the liability exemption of the ECD. By reference to Article 14, Article 15
of the ECD also becomes inapplicable to OCSSPs, however, Article 17(8) CDSM echoes
the general monitoring prohibition of Article 15. And although Article 15(1) ECD is not
applicable to OCSSPs because Article 17 CDSM constitutes a lex specialis regime for
this specific type of intermediaries, by virtue of Article 17(8) such general obligation to
monitor should not arise. There is nothing in the text of the Directive that suggests that
Article 17(8) should be interpreted differently than Article 15(1) ECD, cf. Senftleben, &
Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 26-27; cf. Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 15, who
also stresses that the notion of “general obligation to monitor” is a technical term which
has to be interpreted in the light of the CJEU’s case-law.
199
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 195, 2.6.2004, p. 16-25 (IP
Enforcement Directive).
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In Mc Fadden, the CJEU ruled that “marginally adjusting one of the
technical options open to the provider in exercising its activity” does not
damage the essence of the freedom to conduct a business.200 The question
in this case was whether and how the owner of a music store should
restrict access to an open wireless network in order to prevent unlawful
downloading of protected works in the future. The Court expressly
rejected the option to monitor all the information transmitted via the
internet access of the store owner as well as the complete termination of
the internet connection. While the former option would have run counter
the general monitoring prohibition of Article 15 ECD,201 the latter would
have limited the owner in his exercise of his right under Article 16
EUCFR.
According to AG Szpunar, a lawful monitoring injunction ordered
under Article 15(1) ECD is specific if it is “limited in terms of the subject
and duration of the monitoring”.202 Senftleben and Angelopoulos require
‘double-specificity’ in relation to infringed subject matter and
infringer.203 An unlawful, and therefore ‘general’ obligation to monitor
would therefore have to be more unspecific.204 In a similar vein, Leistner
argues that obligations to monitor uploads in relation to specific
infringing works, although the entirety of uploads to a platform operated
by an OCSSP is subject to a matching exercise, are not of a general nature
and therefore do not fall foul of Article 15(1) ECD or Article 17(8)
CDSM.205 Specifically with regard to staydown duties he draws a parallel
to the CJEU judgment in Glawischnig-Piesczek,206 in which the Court
considered staydown obligations in relation to specific legal violations
compatible with Article 15(1) ECD.207
Following Leistner’s interpretation, the monitoring of specific
infringements, albeit in relation to all uploaded content, would not
constitute a general monitoring obligation. However, Article 17(4)(b) and
(c) read in combination with Article 17(1) Article 17(4)(a) suggest that
OCSSPs would be required to monitor uploads in relation to all works and
other subject matter for which no authorization could be obtained by way

200

CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 91.
CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 87.
202
AG Szpunar, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 132; in this context the AG makes reference
to the preparatory work for the ECD: see AG Jääskinen, Opinion of 09.12.2010, L’Oréal
and Others, Case C-324/09, EU:C:2010:757, para. 182, the AG referred to a requirement
of “double identity”, which requires that the infringer and the infringed subject matter is
the same, which would require an intermediary to terminate or prevent infringements by
the same user of a specific protected subject matter (e.g. a specific trademark). The AG
considered the termination of a user account an appropriate means to achieve this result.
203
Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 2; this double-specificity
requirement would arguably limit the effectiveness of the injunction as further
infringements by other users, or the same users via different accounts, would not come
within the scope of the specific monitoring obligation.
204
Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 24.
205
Leistner, SSRN (2020), pp. 15-16.
206
CJEU, Judgment of 03.10.2019, Glawischnig-Piesczek, Case C-18/18,
EU:C:2019:821.
207
Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 16; See also Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 258.
201
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of agreement with the relevant rightholders. This does not mean, however,
that all uploads in relation to content for which information is provided
by rightholders constitute infringements. Copyright infringement can be
equally nuanced as context-specific defamatory statements, which were
at dispute in Glawischnig-Piesczek.208 Or the upload can constitute a fully
legitimate use, because it is covered by an exception and limitation to
copyright, an assessment that can in itself be a very complex one.
Moreover, the constellation of actors and rights in relation to injuries to
personality rights and copyright infringements cannot be considered to be
equivalent.209 Therefore, in any constellation, it is imperative to
reconsider OCSSP-obligations in the light of FR.
For the meantime, it is sufficient to conclude that, in the case of
Article 17, it seems difficult to imagine how OCSSPs can discharge their
obligations differently than to install filtering and monitoring systems that
would be considered general in nature.210 Although the way information
is provided to OCSSPS might differ depending on the context, the
obligation to ensure the unavailability of certain works will be most easily
and effectively discharged by filtering content based on larger databases
of metadata. As a result, the type of monitoring which will be required, or
to which OCSSPs will be incentivized in order to escape liability will
most likely amount to general monitoring and, as a result, to potential
overblocking of legitimate uses.211 This is in particular the case since the
technology itself has its limits.
A closer look at filtering: technological background
Filtering technology, as it is described in the literature,212 is not as
sophisticated to enable it to make complex decisions on the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of uploads in an automated way.213 Automated filters bear
the risk of creating “false positives”,214 i.e. identifying content as
208
Cf. Aleksandra Kuczerawy, & Clara Rauchegger, Injunctions to remove illegal online
content under the eCommerce Directive: Glawischnig-Piesczek, 57(5) Common Market
Law Review (2020), 1495-1526, p. 1517, even a defamatory statement can be considered
lawful if, by way of quotation, it is included into another news piece which critically
reports on the context in which the defamatory statement was made.
209
Cautioning against an analogy between defamation and copyright infringements
based on Glawischnig-Pieszcek, Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), pp.
14-15 and 29-30.
210
Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 259.
211
Martin Senftleben, Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement – The Pros and Cons
of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability, 14(2) Florida International University
Law Review (2020), 299-328, p. 312, with further references.
212
For a detailed overview of the various filtering technologies see Giovanni Sartor, &
Andrea Loreggia, The Impact of algorithms for online content. “Upload Filters”. Study
requested by the JURI Committee, (2020), p. 35 sq.
213
Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 13. For one of the most
cited works in contemporary copyright literature that describes available filtering
technologies see Engstrom, & Feamster, (2017); see further Reda et al. (2020), p. 27;
Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 5; Dusollier, C.M.L. Rev. (2020), p. 1018.
214
Ben Depoorter, & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89(1) Notre Dame
Law Review (2013), 319-359.
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infringing although it is lawful.
1. Limits of automated filtering technology (false positives)
The discussion on the capability of Article 17 to fight copyright
infringements and the role automated filtering should play in this context,
is based on the misconception that technology is able to solve all
enforcement problems. The EU legislator seems to assume that OCSSPS
can employ ‘intelligent’ filters that identify infringing content while
enabling the upload and making available of lawful content.
However, filtering technologies are not developed as far as it would
be necessary to fulfil the obligations under Article 17 completely with
automated tools.215 None of the currently available filtering technologies
are able to avoid so-called “false positives”, and when currently available
technologies can identify similarities, they are unable to make the oftencomplex assessment whether a similarity between two files amounts to
copyright infringement.216

a. Infringement threshold
Qualitatively, automated tools that are only able to recognize full or
partial matches between two or several files will not be able to assess
whether a particular match, i.e. the full or partial identity between two
files, amounts to a reproduction of either an authorial work, or a related
right. For original works, the originality threshold is impossible to
determine by merely finding certain similarities. Instead, the similarities
must occur in relation to original parts of the underlying work, i.e. the
parts copied must be part of an author’s own intellectual creation.217 For
related rights, although the CJEU has established a relatively low
threshold, a pure quantitative assessment is not sufficient to determine
215
Thomas Spoerri, On Upload-Filters and other Competitive Advantages for Big Tech
Companies under Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market,
10(2) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law
(2019), 173-186, p. 182, see also a study conducted in 2018 which stresses that
YouTube’s ContentID cannot distinguish between unlawful uses and uses that do not
require authorization: Sabine Jacques, Krzystof Garstka, Morten Hviid, & John Street,
An Empirical Study of the Use of Automated Anti-Piracy Systems and Their
Consequences for Cultural Diversity, 15(2) SCRIPTed (2018), 277-312, p. 287;
reiterating this point Krokida, AG’s opinion on Peterson/ YouTube: Clarifying the
liability of online intermediaries for the violation of copyright-protected works?,
available
at:
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/06/ags-opinion-onpeterson-youtube-clarifying-the-liability-of-online-intermediaries-for-the-violation-ofcopyright-protected-works/, accessed: 25.01.2021.
216
Engstrom, & Feamster, (2017), p. 64. See also in this sense, but in the context of the
German implementation of the Directive, Albrecht Conrad and Georg Nolte, Die
Schrankenbestimmungen im Anwendungsbereich des UrhDaG - Zu viele Rollen der
Diensteanbieter beim urheberrechtlichen Interessenausgleich?, ZUM 2021
(forthcoming).
217
See only CJEU, Judgment of 19.07.2009, Infopaq I, Case C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465
and CJEU, Judgment of 11.12.2011, Painer, Case C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798.
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whether a particular file infringes a related right.218

b. Contextual differentiation
Moreover, automated filters, as described above, are unable to
recognize contextual nuances, which is however necessary to distinguish
prima facie infringements from uses that fall within the scope of an
exception. Such distinction would be necessary to differentiate between a
simple reproduction of a part of a work, and the reproduction of the same
part for a use that is parodic or that constitutes a permitted quotation. Both
exceptions must be assessed in the context the use of a protected work
takes place and are based on contextual consideration such as humour or
mockery219 and a dialogue between the original work and the work that
quotes.220 Moreover, artistic creations or user generated content often
includes creative reuses of existing protected works which also might,
under certain conditions, benefit from an exception.221
Intermission: Effects of automated filtering on fundamental rights
Considering the current state of technology, it is very likely that
OCSSPs will have to resort to automated monitoring or filtering in order
to comply with their obligations under Article 17(4) CDSM Directive.222
Against this background, three main concerns arise in relation to
automated filtering when examined through the lens of FR.
First, fulfilling the “best efforts” obligation can significantly restrict
the freedom to conduct a business. The specific impact will differ between
OCSSPs and their relative economic capacities must be considered in
relation to the harm caused to rightholders on the respective platform.223
218

CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, see the standard developed by the court, which
requires whether a sample taken is “unrecognisable to the ear” (para. 31.).
219
CJEU, C-201/13 Deckmyn, para. 20.
220
CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, paras. 71-73.
221
See for example the case of sampling, for which the CJEU in principle left room for
an application of the quotation exception of the sample is used in a dialogic manner
(CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, para 72), see also Bernd Justin Jütte, CJEU permits
sampling of phonograms under a de minimis rule and the quotation exception, 14(11)
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2019), 827-829, p. 828. Other forms
of arts borrow from protected works and have been considered as lawful because falling
under the protection of freedom of artistic creativity (See Christophe Geiger, When
Freedom of Artistic Expression allows Creative Appropriations and Opens up Statutory
Copyright Limitations, in: Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Ng-Loy Wee Loon, & Haochen
Sun (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Copyright Limitations and Exceptions,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021) p. 174).
222
See supra 3.3.1.2.
223
For example, it will surely be problematic for smaller OCSSPs who would have to
acquire filtering software that complies with “high industry standards”, the cost of which
could jeopardize the economic viability of their business models. See in general on the
difficulty of smaller OCSSPs to gain access to sophisticated filtering technology see
Spoerri, JIPITEC (2019), pp. 184-185; see in this sense Engstrom, & Feamster, (2017),
p. 22-23, who conclude that “for smaller OSPs, the cost of these systems would make it
significantly harder to attract investors and compete with dominant incumbents. In a
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Second, users of platforms will be affected when they try to upload
content which is filtered and blocked by automated mechanisms; users
who access content via online sharing platforms will be restricted in their
right to receive information. Third, the restriction of the right to receive
and impart information must be balanced against the right of authors and
other rightholders who have a vested interest to enforce their intellectual
property rights. Without some form of enforcement, they could find
themselves deprived of the essence of their rights.224 However,
overenforcement, which would result in collateral overblocking of lawful
uses, would in many cases be disproportionate to the protection provided
to rightholders through automated filtering technologies necessitated by
Article 17 CDSM. As we have already demonstrated, they will have
detrimental effects on free speech and the exercise of user rights.225
Whether these concerns can be mitigated with effective countermeasures
will be decisive in assessing whether Article 17 unduly restricts the FR
concerned.
Addressing fundamental rights in the mechanisms of Article 17 – a
proper balance?
The obligations for OCSSPs under Article 17(4) raise significant
questions in relation to their compatibility with FR.226 Their specific
scope is vague and dotted with terminology that requires specification
(e.g. “best efforts”). Primarily, national transpositions will have to give
concrete shape to this new and unclear specific liability regime, which in
turn raises serious concerns that diverging transpositions will fail to
achieve a harmonized legal framework.227 As we have seen, national
transpositions must also consider the effects of EU FR on legislation that

survey of investors in the U.S. and EU, a majority of respondents said they would be
“uncomfortable investing in businesses that would be required by law to run a
technological filter on user uploaded content.”
224
CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, paras. 98-99.
225
See also Depoorter, & Walker, Notre Dame L. Rev. (2013), p. 322. It must be
highlighted here that, due to the technological limitations of filtering technologies, which
will most likely be employed due to the relative expensiveness of other mechanisms (e.g.
human review) or their lack of effectiveness (e.g. flagging), automated enforcement
carries the risk to create disproportionately many ‘false positives’, i.e. takedowns of
content which do not infringe or which is covered by an exception or imitation. The
sheer amount of likely false positives constitutes non-negligible restrictions to the right
to freedom of expression and the right to artistic freedom in particular when online
platforms are used to disseminate musical and audio-visual artistic creativity (cf. AG
Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, para. 241).
226
Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 7.
227
See for example Paul Keller, Divergence instead of guidance: the Article 17
implementation
discussion
in
2020
–
Part
1,
available
at:
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/21/divergence-instead-of-guidance-thearticle-17-implementation-discussion-in-2020-part-1/, accessed: 25.01.2021, and 2,
available at: http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/22/divergence-instead-ofguidance-the-article-17-implementation-discussion-in-2020-part-2/,
accessed:
25.01.2021.
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implements EU secondary law.
Adding to this uncertainty is the question of how to combine the
obligations set by Art. 17(4) with Article 17(7), which sets a
counterweight in the copyright balance by providing users of OCSSPs
with a guarantee that the obligations for OCSSPs under Article 17(1) and
17(4) should not prevent them from making lawful uses of works and
other subject matter protected by copyright.
In the following sections we will demonstrate that rightholders and
OCSSPs alone, in cooperation with each other, and with the mere reliance
on technology, are likely to fail in maintaining a balance between the
various FR. We will highlight the most relevant rifts in FR protection
under the most commonly discussed scenarios in various recent studies.
1. Best efforts to obtain authorization (Article 17(4)(a))
The obligation to obtain authorization consists of two components: to
assess whether contents on their services require licenses and to obtain
authorization for the use of that content.228 Leistner argues that the
systematic structure of Article 17(4) suggests that OCSSPs incur an
obligation to investigate actively infringing content and undertake best
efforts to obtain licenses for the relevant works and subject matter.229 In
any case, OCSSPs cannot remain passive and refrain from actively
engaging with rightholders to obtain the required authorizations.230
Considering that the efforts that must be undertaken have to be
proportionate, Leistner argues further that OCSSPs cannot be expected to
enter into licensing agreements with all rightholders, including smaller
artists.231 An obligation to identify all infringing works, even if, as
228

Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255.
Cf. Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 23.
230
It must also be considered, when assessing the best efforts undertaken by OCSSPs,
that identifying the rightholders in relation to content uploaded by users can itself pose
a significant challenge.
231
Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 24, the information and transactions cost arising from such
an obligation would be immense and would require OCSSPs to invest significantly in
their licensing efforts. Leistner argues that it would suffice if platform operators enter
into agreements with major rightholders and collecting societies. See to that effect also
Article 12 CDSM Directive, which enables extended collective licensing. This,
admittedly, would be problematic as smaller artists, which are most of the time the most
in need for better licensing revenues, would be discriminated against. Spindler on the
contrary proposes that smaller rightholders could instead be offered to monetize their
rights. He argues that although OCSSPs cannot be required to conclude licenses with all
rightholder, a positive obligation exists for platform operators to identify rightholders
whose works are infringed on their platforms. He argues further that even proportionality
would not limit this obligation to random checks for infringing content, (Spindler, GRUR
(2020), p. 255). Given the sheer amount of potentially infringing content on larger
platforms, but also the economic means required to conduct such searches, this
interpretation might be difficult to put into practice. A proactive search and verification
obligation in relation to potentially all uploads would pose significant problems with
respect to Article 16 EUCFR as it would amount to a general monitoring. In any case,
the practical difficulties in concluding licenses with righholders of content uploaded by
others cannot lead to discrimination to the detriment of smaller right holders.
229
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Spindler argues, the systematic structure of Article 17 seems to suggest
this, would place a disproportionately high burden on platform
operators.232 Moreover, the European Copyright Society argues that this
requirement would effectively amount to a general monitoring
obligation.233
Once an OCSSP has entered into negotiations with a rightholder or,
more likely, with a group of rightholders or their representative (e.g. a
collecting society), the platform operator cannot be expected to accept
every offer.234 The amount due for a license to use specific works and
subject matter must be proportionate in relation to the size of the platform
and the number of its users.235 In this sense, the notion of ‘best efforts’
has a very concrete financial dimension. It must be possible for an OCSSP
to reject an unreasonable license offer236 while still complying with the
requirement under Article 17(4)(a). An obligation to contract at a price
determined by rightholders would significantly restrict the freedom to
conduct a business by limiting the economic choices of platform
operators.237 Effectively, an obligation to contract cannot be derived from
Article 17(4).238 However, OCSSPs can be expected to enter into genuine
negotiations in good faith in order to enable the lawful use of relevant
works or other subject matter.239
2. Targeted and tailored filtering obligations
Having made best efforts, unsuccessfully, to obtain authorizations for
works and other subject matter protected by copyright, OCSSPs incur the
two cumulative obligations to prevent uploads of unauthorized works, to
remove upon notice unauthorized works and prevent their future uploads.
We have demonstrated above that any obligation arising under Article
17(4)(b) and (c) cannot amount to a general monitoring obligation.240
Therefore, any obligation to remove or block access to content must
be strictly targeted and tailored. The CJEU has recently ruled in
Glawischnig-Piesczek that a hosting platform cannot be burdened with
excessive obligations, more specifically it cannot be expected that hosting
232

Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255.
The European Copyright Society (2020), p. 119, the drafters of the opinion argue
further that OCSSPs can be expected to proactively contact larger rightholders and
would only act reactively upon notification by smaller and independent rightholders.
234
See Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 24, who argues convincingly that at least all available
collective licenses should be obtained.
235
See to that effect Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255: if the fees demanded by the
rightholders are unreasonably high, an OCSSP cannot be expected to enter into an
agreement.
236
Spindler, JIPITEC (2019), pp. 348-349.
237
Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255. Similarly, an operator of a hosting platform must also
be permitted to refuse to conclude a license in the first place. The obligation to
demonstrate best efforts cannot result in an obligation to contract. This would effectively
enable rightholders to set the financial conditions under which OCSSPs have to operate.
238
Cf. Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255.
239
Cf. The European Copyright Society (2020), p. 119.
240
See supra 3.2.
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platforms actively seek information on infringing or generally illegal
activity, or conduct an independent assessment of the illegality of acts.241
In UPC Telekabel, the Court argued that an intermediary can be required
to take certain measures that necessitate the use of economic resources.
However, the intermediary must only take reasonable measures and not
make “unbearable sacrifices”.242 Moreover the intermediary must be able
to anticipate and, if necessary, verify, in the light of the principle of legal
certainty, whether the measures taken are sufficient to comply with the
requirements of Article 17(4)(b) and (c).243
A targeted filtering obligation must also ensure that the collateral
effects of such a measure are kept at a minimum.244 In exercising their
respective right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive
information, users who post and access content on a platform must be able
to perform lawful acts. A broad filtering mechanism which would result
in overblocking of lawful content would most certainly restrict the right
to freedom of expression in a way which would be difficult to justify in
this specific constellation.
Therefore, any measure that OCSSPs take to fulfil the conditions
under Article 17(4)(b) must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the purpose of that condition, which is to protect the economic rights of
rightholders. Several elements must be considered in order to define the
scope of these obligation. First, Article 17(4)(b) refers to “specific works
and other subject matter”. These are the types of content in relation to
which OCSSPs incur an obligation to, second, “ensure [their]
unavailability”. Third, OCSSPs are only required to ensure the
unavailability of the specific works or subject matter if rightholders have
provided them with “relevant and necessary information.”

a. Prevent access to specific works and subject matter (Article
17(4)(b))
It is necessary to distinguish the obligations arising under Article
17(4)(b) and (c). Whereas under subparagraph (c), obligations similar, but
not identical, to those in L’Oréal v eBay arise (i.e. the removal of notified

241

CJEU, C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek, para. 46.
The Court makes one specific qualification that could differentiate the situation in
UPC Telekabel from that arising under Article 17. In para. 53 it states: “That possibility
of exoneration clearly has the effect that the addressee of the injunction will not be
required to make unbearable sacrifices, which seems justified in particular in the light of
the fact that he is not the author of the infringement of the fundamental right of
intellectual property which has led to the adoption of the injunction.” One could argue
that the extension of the communication to the public right under Article 17(1) would
change this assessment because OCSSPs become legally responsible for acts committed
by their users. Nevertheless, this constitutes a legal fiction and the actual act that causes
the infringement is performed not by the platform operator but by a third party, Therefore
the reasoning in UPC Telekabel should also be applicable for the liability exemption
under Article 17(4) CDSM Directive.
243
Cf. CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 54.
244
Cf. Reda et al. (2020), p. 28.
242
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content), obligations under subparagraph (b) are different and go further.
This can be explained from the systematic structure of Article 17(4).245
The monitoring of content in order to ensure the unavailability of
specific works requires that specific works are identified. This requires
direct cooperation between rightholders and OCSSPs.246 That cooperation
cannot, however, result in the advance flagging of large repertoires of
music and audio-visual material without any indication of prior
infringement or at least the likelihood of future infringements.247 Such an
arrangement would move the process that results in decision to block and
filter – in itself a stark restriction of Article 11 EUCFR – outside the reach
of users and constitute a significant restriction to the right to an effective
remedy. How, then, can rightholders and OCSSPs find ways to stay
within the permitted scope of ‘specific’ and ‘targeted’ monitoring
mechanisms to ensure that certain works and subject matter are made
unavailable?
The two extremes of filtering are illustrated by SABAM v Netlog (for
hosting providers in relation to copyright) and by Glawischnig-Piesczek
(for hosting providers in relation to personality rights). While in SABAM
v Netlog, the CJEU found an obligation to filter indiscriminately not to be
in compliance with the obligations arising under the ECD,248 it found in
Glawischnig-Piesczek that an injunction that targets specific content
uploaded by specific users would not constitute a general filtering
obligation.249 The AG in the latter case even extended the personal scope
of such an obligation to all users of a service, as long as the specificity of
the subject matter limits the scope of an injunction.250 And here lies the
main distinction that justifies a relatively broad filtering obligation,
because the subject matter that must be monitored and filtered is not only
specifically defined, but it is also determined by a court which issues an
injunction before a platform operator commences with monitoring and
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Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 31.
Article 17(7) in its relevant part reads: “The cooperation between online contentsharing service providers and shall not result in the prevention of the availability of
works or other subject matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright and
related rights, including where such works or other subject matter are covered by an
exception or limitation.”
247
This type of cooperation would certainly lead to a monitoring obligation which is
more on the ‘general’ side of the spectrum, rather than of a ‘specific’ nature.
248
CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, the Court ruled that EU law precludes a filtering
obligation that obliges a hosting provider to install a mechanism that applies to
information which is stored on its servers by its service users, which applies
indiscriminately to all of those users, as a preventative measure, exclusively at its
expense, and for an unlimited period.
249
CJEU, C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek, para. 35; See Kuczerawy, & Rauchegger,
C.M.L. Rev. (2020), p. 1499: the authors criticize that the CJEU did not consider
sufficiently the impact of such an injunction of the rights of users, who will be affected
even by a specific filtering mechanism (p. 1524).
250
AG Szpunar, Opinion of 04.96.2019, Glawischnig-Piesczek, Case C-18/18,
EU:C:2019:458, para. 59; it is worth noting that due to the type of injunction sought in
this case (interlocutory), the injunction was also limited in time (see para. 60).
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filtering.251
In particular in relation to copyright infringements, the necessity to
take down and remove infringing works or other subject matter
expeditiously is not comparable to the necessity that arises in relation to
other content.252 It would, therefore, be more proportionate to limit the
portfolio of works and other subject matter the upload of which can be
prevented to such works specifically identified as infringing. 253
Automated filtering would then apply only to uploads which are
manifestly illegal.254
A study by the Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte departs from the
assumption that the obligation to ensure the unavailability of specific
works or subject matter can only be guaranteed by the employment of
automated filters.255 These filters, however, cannot discern context.256 But
only if a distinction between lawful and unlawful context can be made,
can a proper balance between the various interests and FR be achieved.257
251

The relevant passage reads: “(…) it is important that the equivalent information
referred to in paragraph 41 above contains specific elements which are properly
identified in the injunction, such as the name of the person concerned by the
infringement determined previously, the circumstances in which that infringement was
determined and equivalent content to that which was declared to be illegal. Differences
in the wording of that equivalent content, compared with the content which was declared
to be illegal, must not, in any event, be such as to require the host provider concerned to
carry out an independent assessment of that content.” CJEU, C-18/18 GlawischnigPiesczek, para. 45. However, even a complete congruence of an upload with a protected
work can still be lawful if it falls within the scope of an exception. Most of such matches
would require an independent assessment, but per Glawischnig-Piesczek this assessment
cannot be imposed on online platforms.
252
E.g. child pornography and terrorist content, cf. European Parliament, European
Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 on the Digital Services Act and fundamental
right issues posed (2020/2022(INI)), P9_TA(2020)0274, EP, 20.10.2020, paras. 11-13,
at para. 13 the European Parliament stresses that in relation to illegal content online,
intermediaries should not be obliged to install automated tool to moderate content.
253
For example, because they have been already recognized as copyright infringement
by a court. In this case, it seems totally appropriate that a content what has been taken
down as a result as court decision should be not be uploaded again and upload filters
could prevent that.
254
See e.g. Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020), p. 37, see also Maxime Lambrecht, Free
Speech by Design. Algorithmic protection of exceptions and limitations in the Copyright
DSM directive, 11(1) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and ECommerce Law (2020), 68-94, p. 89; Quintais et al., JIPITEC (2019), see also a letter
sent to Commissioner Breton on 14.09.2020 by 27 civil society and users’ organizations,
available
at
https://www.euractiv.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2020/09/Civil_society_letter_Art17_consultation.pdf, accessed
on 25.01.2021. Lambrecht relates such a criterion to the Glawischnig-Piesczek standard,
which would oblige OCSSPs to prevent imminent harms, i.e. uploads which are only
imminent harms and should not extend to potentially harmful uploads, the verification
of which would require OCSSPs to conduct further investigations, Lambrecht, JIPITEC
(2020), pp. 89-90, the author further explains that rightholders would not be left without
protection but could resort to the ‘traditional’ mechanisms of takedown requests or court
injunctions.
255
Reda et al. (2020), p. 25.
256
Reda et al. (2020), p. 26, see also P9_TA(2020)0274, para. 12.
257
The collateral effect of employing filtering technology is that the rights of users will
be significantly restricted, which can lead to a chilling effect. As a result of overblocking
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In order to ensure legal certainty and to preserve some of the very essence
of the right to intellectual property of rightholders whose works and
subject matter are shared on online platforms, merely relying on user-selfdeclaration258 would be insufficient.259
The notion of “best efforts” implies that not all infringing content has
to be made unavailable. Here exists ample room for consideration based
on FR in designing the combination of technological or human tools used
to ensure obligations arising under Article 17(4) can be fulfilled.260 This
leaves the question of how, in maintaining a proper balance, to identify
the works that can be subject to removal and, to a specifically defined
extent, be filtered.
A combination of measures including human intervention, both by
users and OCSSPs, and some sort of automated filtering significantly
increases the burden on platform operators. In essence, general
monitoring that results in overblocking is most likely the most costeffective mechanism that would least restrict OCSSPs freedom to conduct
a business and help them to avoid primary liability.261 The restrictive
effects on the rights of users would be significant and such restrictions
could certainly not be justified. A solution that creates a fair balance at
FR level is difficult to imagine within this complicated constellation.

and user frustration through repeated unsuccessful upload, albeit of lawful content, users
can be incentivized to switch platforms or cease using them altogether. Highlighting the
risk of overblocking- “that is removing access to more than one wishes to, or more than
the law requires”- see Garstka, Guiding the Blind Bloodhonds: How to Mitigate the
Risks Article 17 of Directive 2019/970 Poses to the Freedom of Expression in:
Torremans (2020), p. 332.
258
Also suggested as an intermediary step, see Quintais et al., JIPITEC (2019), p. 280.
259
This is not to say that user self-declarations should not be part of the combination of
measure that will also serve to guarantee the rights of users. In this way, platform users
can be reasonably included in the cooperation between rightholders and platform
operators to create a just and fair balance of interests.
260
Senftleben and Angelopoulos suggest other, albeit not equally effective options, that
could be installed in lieu of filtering technology. Such alternatives could include the cooption of users to flag infringing content, pop-up banners that inform users that
uploading infringing content is prohibited and contractual regulation and information
through terms and conditions, Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 23;
the authors make reference to the original draft of what became Article 17 CDSM
Directive, which expressly referred to content recognition technologies as measures to
fulfil the preventive obligation under Article 17(4)(b). Whether this omission in the final
version means the principled exclusion of such technological tools while the provision
refers to “high industry standards of professional diligence” (see also recital 66) or
merely tries to hide the facts that some sort of technological filtering in necessary cannot
be determined with certainty. However, recital 66 also states that in assessing whether
the high industry standards of professional diligence have been complied with it is
necessary to consider, also in the light of the principle of proportionality “the evolving
state of the art as regards existing means, including potential future developments, to
avoid the availability of different types of content and the cost of such means for the
services.”
261
Cf. Spoerri, JIPITEC (2019), p. 183.
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b. Disable access upon notification
The requirement to disable access upon notification pursuant to
Article 17(4)(c) seems unproblematic at first look. In accordance with the
wording of the provisions, OCSSPs can only be expected to remove
infringing content when the rightholders provide “sufficiently
substantiated notice”. All major user-generated content platforms already
foresee mechanisms by which content can be flagged for copyright
infringement.262
The requirement to provide “sufficiently substantiated notice” reflects
FR concerns over excessive content flagging. OCSSPs should only be
required to remove content if it is likely that the uploaded material indeed
infringes copyright.263 The obligation to remove content becomes
problematic, from a FR perspective, when it is combined with the
obligation to prevent future uploads of works or other subject matter that
have been removed after an OCSSP has been notified.

c. Best efforts to ensure future unavailability of specific works (Article
17(4)(c))
The obligation that arises under Article 17(4)(c) requires OCSSPs to
monitor and ensure the unavailability protected subject matter the future,
which is in temporal relationship to the moment in which an infringing
work has been notified. The speech-restrictive effect of a cumulation of
filtering requirements would also grow increasingly the more
rightsholders notify infringing works, morphing eventually into a general
monitoring and filtering obligation.264 In this context, the notion of ‘best
efforts’ must be interpreted in the same way as under Article 17(4)(b).
Therefore, considered in the light of FR, the obligation to prevent
future uploads after rightholders have given notice of infringing content
must be subject to reasonable restrictions in terms of time and subject
matter. First, the future unavailability cannot be extended ad infinitum in
order to enable uses, in particular lawful uses, at a later point. Second, the
obligation to prevent uploads must also be targeted.
The obligations for OCSSPs can therefore not extend to an obligation
that would require such platforms to take measures that would effectively
have the same effects on the exercise on FR as a general filtering
obligation. As automated filters cannot assess copyright infringements
beyond the first step, i.e to determine whether a prima facie infringement
has occurred,265 OCSSPs must employ other means to distinguish
262

This approach is expressly foreseen in Article 14 ECD.
See supra 3.5.2.1, i.e. that the content is identical or manifestly infringing, however
in relation to notifications for takedowns, in order to ensure the rights of users, the
takedown and subsequent staydown should only be effected after a procedure that
safeguard the right to an effective remedy, including the right to be heard for users.
264
Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 3.
265
Even prima facie infringements are difficult to determine with certainty, due to the
qualitative nature of the originality requirement; see in general Reda et al. (2020), p. 27.
Particularly in relation to related rights, in which the CJEU has introduced a subjective
263
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infringing uploads from uploads that are lawful. A contextual analysis,
and more importantly an expeditious analysis of uploads, that cannot be
assessed automatically will require the investment of significant resources
initially, but also at the stage of user complaints.
It is important here to restate the complex implications of moderating
user complaints that OCSSPs would have to navigate that would, it is
argued here, result in significant restrictions of freedom of expression and
also create disproportionate burdens for platforms. First the lack of
substantive harmonization of copyright exceptions and limitations creates
very high information costs.266 As a result, the same uploaded content can
be infringing in one Member States, while fully lawful in another.
Additionally, problematic in this constellation is that these decisions that
potentially restrict freedom of expression would have to be made by
private actors, which are charged with safeguarding the rights of users and
rightholders, which are themselves difficult to reconcile.267 Instead, the
decisions to maintain or to remove notified content must be made by a
neutral intermediary which is not biased by its own economic
preferences.268

d. Proportionality as a horizontal requirement (Article 17(5))
Article 17(5) makes express reference to the proportionality principle.
In assessing whether an OCSSP has complied with its obligations arising
under paragraph 4, the specific characteristics of the service provider have
to be taken into consideration (a) as well as the availability of suitable and
effective means and their cost for the service provider (b). Also, the type
of works and other subject matter uploaded by the user needs to be
considered, which if interpreted in a freedom of expression and
information-compliant manner might lead to a differentiation between
uploads of works that carry important societal information of political,
element into the infringement test, automates filters that are fine-tunes to identify
marginal similarities, will create a large number of false positives.
266
See in general Lucie M.C.R. Guibault, Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to
Harmonisation: The Case of the Limitations on Copyright under Directive 2001/29/EC,
1(1) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law
(2010), 55-66; Christophe Geiger & Franciska Schönherr, Defining the Scope of
Protection of Copyright in the EU: The Need to Reconsider the Acquis regarding
Limitations and Exceptions, in: Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou (ed.), Codification of European
Copyright Law. Challenges and Perspectives, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
International, 2012), 133-167. See further recital 5 CDSM Directive. See also in this
sense, Christophe Geiger and Franciska Schönherr, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
of Consumers in relation to Copyright, Summary Report (EUIPO 2017)
<https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/web/observatory/observatory-publications>
(listing exceptions and limitations to copyright as one of the areas of major divergence
in national copyright law).
267
In assessing whether an OCSSP has complied with the ‘best efforts’ standard it is not
only necessary to consider the economic impact of such an obligation on the individual
OCSSP, but also, and probably more importantly, the effects on the availability of lawful
content. In the end, OCSSPs should not be able to demonstrate best efforts with the result
that users are significantly hindered in their exercise of their Article 11 and 16 rights.
268
See more detailed infra 3.6.
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scientific or artistic nature and other uploads. The former will need to be
appreciated with specific care. The appreciation of the compliance with
Art. 17 (4) will be made on a case-by-case basis, as the list of elements to
be taken into account is non-limitative.269
The choice of factors suggests, also in combination with the
exceptions under Article 17(6), that smaller and economically less potent
OCSSPs will not be measured in the same way as larger OCSSPs would.
In general, the proportionality principle should ensure that OCSSPs do
not incur too high a burden and that rightholders must also contribute to
the enforcement of their rights.270 And although it does not become
apparent from the wording of Article 17(5), recital 66 also makes
reference to the purpose limitation of the measure that have to be
implemented pursuant to Article 17(4), which should “not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve the objective of avoiding and discontinuing
the availability of unauthorised works and other subject matter.”
Accordingly, the design of the measures must consider the interest of
smaller platforms but also users as part of a wider proportionality
analysis.
3. Safeguarding fundamental user rights (Article 17(7))
Against a potentially overreaching enforcement regime based on
Article 17(4), Article 17(7) provides that Member States must foresee
safeguards for the exercise of lawful uses by users of online contentsharing platform.271 Furthermore, Article 17(7), second sentence provides
that users must be able to rely on specific exceptions when uploading and
making available works and other subject matter on online contentsharing services. The exceptions are those for quotation, criticism, review,
and use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche.

a. The primary obligation to guarantee lawful uses
Article 17(7) states that the “cooperation between online contentsharing service providers and rightholders shall not result in the
prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded
by users”.272 In the light of the right to freedom of expression and artistic
freedom, this formulation should be read to the effect that initial (read:
preventive) filtering of content should not lead to the unavailability of
works the upload of which is lawful or non-infringing.273
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This is confirmed by the wording of Article 17(5) which specifies that “the following
elements, among others, shall be taken into account” (emphasis added) when assessing
whether the obligations of Article 17 (4) are met.
270
In this regard recital 66 CDSM Directive considers Article 17(4)(c) as an expression
of proportionality.
271
The provision refers expressly to non-infringing uses, including uses covered by an
exception or limitation.
272
Emphasis added.
273
Uploaded works, the rights of which are not owned by the uploader, can be non-
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Preventing such uploads initially, because they have been caught by
an upload filter, would constitute a form of censorship. Such a restriction
of the rights under Articles 11 and 13 EUCFR is generally not justified,
even if the possibility of review could eventually lead to the availability
of the work or other subject matter at a later point. The preventive
blocking of an entire website without any prior legal proceedings and no
indication that the website contained unlawful content was ruled to be in
violation of Article 10 ECHR by the ECtHR in Yıldırım v. Turkey.274 The
Strasbourg court underlined that any preventive measures that restricts the
right to freedom for expression, although not in principle irreconcilable
with Article 10, are “inconceivable without a framework establishing
precise and specific rules regarding the application of preventive
restrictions on freedom of expression.”275 While in Yıldırım v. Turkey, a
Turkish court had ordered to block all access to Google Sites in order to
prevent access to a specific site, the same reasoning should apply to an
overblocking of lawful content on an online content-sharing platform,
moreover as a preventive measure. The ECtHR further stressed the
importance of balancing the restrictive measure and considered it a
necessity, which must also be reflected in the legal basis that permits the
restriction of the right to freedom of expression.276
A requirement for national courts to consider the effects of a blocking
order is not contained in Article 17, because the decision to block or filter
is made by OCSSPS based on their cooperation with rightholders.
Moreover, Article 17 refers to proportionality only in relation to the extent
of the ‘best efforts’ standard in Article 17(5). A framework with clear and
precise rules that governs preventive restrictions of the right to freedom
of expression, or the right to artistic freedom for that purpose is missing
in Article 17.
As a result, the formulation of Article 17(7) suggests that monitoring
and filtering as measures to ensure the unavailability of works or other
subject matter is not permitted because this would prevent the availability
of non-infringing content and thereby constitute and unjustified
restriction to Articles 11 and 13 EUCFR.277 Assigning priority to the
infringing either because the uploader has obtained authorization, or because they fall
within the scope of one of the exceptions provided for by one of the various copyright
directives, most notably Article 5 (2) and (3) InfoSoc Directive.
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interest of users to exercise lawful uses underlines a hierarchy between
Article 17(4) and 17(7) which does not become immediately apparent
from the overall structure of Article 17. Nevertheless, contrary to what
the governments of France and Spain have argued in the hearing on the
annulment action in Case C-401/19, the wording of Article 17(7) read in
the light of FR mandates that uploads are not initially filtered and
reinstated after the user appeals through a complaint mechanism.278
Instead, the default position is that uploads should initially be available
and rightholders can then flag them to the OCSSP which, in the absence
of any further indication in the text of the CDSM Directive, has to assess
the veracity of the claim. This is also the position taken by the European
Commission and the European Parliament during the hearing on the
Polish challenge to Article 17.279 The procedural safeguards should not
work to the detriment of the user but still enable rightholders to indicate
infringing content. Against takedowns, subsequent to reasoned and
reasonable complaints, users would then still have the opportunity to
complain and demand redress, possibly, as is argued below, through ADR
mechanisms offered by an independent institution.280 Article 17(9)
requires that out-of-court mechanisms are made available to users to “not
deprive the user of the legal protection afforded by national law”. The
disputes before such bodies should be settled impartially.
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b. The imperatives of exceptions and limitations
Article 17(7) CDSM provides that users of online content-sharing
services shall be able to rely on the exceptions or limitations for (a)
quotation, criticism, review and the (b) the use for the purpose of
caricature, parody or pastiche when uploading or making available
content generated by users. First and foremost, this formulation (‘shall’)
makes these exceptions mandatory, as opposed to their equivalents in the
InfoSoc Directive.281 Furthermore, singling out these exceptions from all
the others included in Article 5(2) and (3) InfoSoc Directive suggests that
these two specific sets of exceptions are more important, or distinguish
themselves in some other way from all other exceptions. It is safe to say,
in any case, that the exceptions or limitations that must be available to
users of online content-sharing services are highly reflective of the right
to freedom of expression and artistic freedom.282 Their appearance in
Article 17 is another indication of the importance of FR, in particular the
informational FR of users.283
This freedom would be restricted if uses falling within the scope of
one of the exceptions listed, and certainly also other exceptions that are
available under the respective national laws, would be prevented by
general or specific filtering. The specific importance of certain types of
expression, particularly speech of a political nature,284 would weigh
heavily against the application of content filters by OCSSPs that would
inevitably create collateral effects on lawful speech.285 For this purpose,
procedural safeguards are essential.
The operation of such procedural safeguards by platforms raises
further problems which are rooted in the lack of full harmonization of
copyright exceptions in the EU. Not only does the assessment of whether
a particular assessment is infringing require a delicate legal analysis when
a use potentially falls within the scope of a copyright exceptions. But
281
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these relevant exceptions might be implemented in one Member Sate
while they remain unimplemented in another. Article 17(7) merely
requires that certain exception must be available for users of online
platforms, but it does not mean that in different Member States users
cannot also rely on others. Diverging national lists of copyright
exceptions therefore add another layer of complexity to the obligations of
OCSSPs under Article 17.

c. Procedural safeguards
The removal of works or in cases in which access has been disabled,
users of online content-sharing platforms must have access to effective
and expeditious complaint and redress mechanisms.286 AG Szpunar in
Glawischnig-Piesczek underlined that users must be able to challenge
implementing measures of intermediaries before a court as a safeguard
for the exercise of freedom of expression.287 The specific design of the
mechanisms is not described by Article 17(9) CDSM, thus adding to the
uncertainty with regard to a sufficient protection of the rights of users, but
the standards that apply in order to enable users to challenge unjustified
takedowns and staydowns of their uploaded content are laid down here.
First and foremost, complaint mechanisms must be effective and
expeditious. This requires that OCSSPs make resources available to
process user requests relatively fast. Depending on the nature of the
content, the urgency of a complaint will differ, while slightly longer
processing periods could be considered proportionate for content with an
entertainment purpose, which can nevertheless be protected by Article 13
EUCFR. Content that serves to participate in a current political debate, or
which comments on current events, will require a more expedited
procedure.288 These differentiations will have to be embedded in
complaint mechanisms in order to safeguard the exercise of FR.
The design of complaint and redress mechanisms can also not be
decoupled from considerations on the design of Article 17(4) obligations.
The amount of and the way how content is filtered will determine the
volume of complaints platforms will have to handle and how much
resources they have to expend on establishing complaint and redress
mechanisms.289 This correlation has direct implications on OCSSPs
freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 EUCFR, especially
because decisions to remove content pursuant to Article 17(4)(b) must be
subject to human review.
Whereas these obligations to ensure proper (human) review of likely
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automated takedowns and staydowns and removal requests serve to
ensure the rights of users, the burden imposed on OCSSPS is not
insignificant. Moreover, the proportionality considerations under Article
17(5) relate expressly only to obligations arising under Article 17(4).
Placing this obligation on OCSSPS would neither respect the right to an
effective remedy and a fair trial, nor the freedom to conduct a business of
OCSSPs. Instead, this mandated element of human review must be
located elsewhere, preferable in the out-of-court mechanisms expressly
referred to in Article 17(9).
Resolving fundamental rights conflicts through an institutional
mediator
Our analysis of the FR implications of Article 17 CDSM Directive has
demonstrated that within the express wording, and certainly within a
narrow reading of Article 17, a fair balance of interests is extremely
difficult if not impossible to achieve.290 More critically, the restrictive and
limiting effects Article 17 will inevitably have on the rights of users and
platform operators are not sufficiently defined in the text of the provision.
Instead, the burden of the task to protect the rights of rightholders must
be borne by OCSSPs, which also have to make critical decisions which
will, in many cases, restrict the right to freedom of expression and the
right to artistic freedom. This burden has, as we have amply
demonstrated, significant restrictive effects on the freedom to conduct a
business of platform operators, not least by failing to provide legal
certainty as to the specific scope of the obligations OCSSPs incur under
Article 17. Moreover, the lack of legal certainty created by insufficient
harmonization of important aspects of copyright law in the EU (e.g.
limitations and exceptions and moral rights), combined with the
foreseeable differing transpositions of Article 17 in the EU Member
States, creates further difficulties for OCSSPs with potentially
detrimental effects of the rights of users and rightholders, and certainly
for platform operators.
One of the most critical defects of Article 17 is that normative
decisions on the balance between the various FR are outsourced to private
platform operators, who, in addition, will have to provide a quasi-judicial
appeals infrastructure to mediate between rightholders and users. Putting
this responsibility in the hands of private economic actors not only
burdens them with costly procedures but also fundamentally undermines
the effective protection of FR if these actors have their own economic
interests which will most likely influence their decision making.
A possible solution to this triangular dilemma would be to introduce
an institutional intermediary.291 The legislative seed from which such a
290
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regulatory institution can be developed lies buried in Article 17(9). In the
adopted version of Article 17, “out-of-court” redress mechanisms are
foreseen for users,292 which should also have access to a court “or another
relevant judicial authority to assert the use of an exception or
limitation”.293 We argue, however, that an institution that deals, certainly
in last instance, with user complaints could also serve to pre-emptively
safeguard the rights of users and rightholders and develop guidelines and
best practices to enable OCSSPS to comply with their obligations.294 An
independent institution that sits firmly at the intersection of the various
interests could more realistically contribute, through several mechanisms,
to maintaining a fair and proper balance between the FR at stake.295
First, such an ‘intermediary institution’ could determine the standards
that apply to targeted filtering obligation. Targeted filtering is
undoubtedly necessary to create a proper balance within Article 17 and is
not excluded by Article 17(8). Therefore, the task to define what uploads
constitute ‘manifestly infringing’ material which can then be subject to
advance filtering should be delegated to a neutral independent third party,
ideally an EU oversight institution that would inter alia have the task to
guarantee a FR compliant implementation of Art. 17 at least in this
respect. Substantively, it is certainly not sufficient to rely on standards
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such as identity or significant quantitative congruencies. The standard of
what constitutes ‘manifestly infringing’,296 should be developed and
constantly reviewed by this institution that is vested with judicial or quasijudicial powers.
Thereby, OCSSPs would be relieved from the responsibility to decide
in borderline cases between lawful and unlawful uses, giving such
decisions more legitimacy; and the rights of users would be better
safeguarded by avoiding most overblocking of lawful content.
Second, notice and takedown and staydown decisions could be
administered by such an independent institution, with the same benefits
as outlined in the preceding paragraphs. In addition, interposing an
independent institution in the cooperation between users and rightholders
ensured observance with the right to a fair trial and an effective remedy.
ADR mechanisms to mediate conflicts between rightholders, platform
and users and develop best practices and guidelines for filtering practice
that would respect EU primary law will also need to be implemented and
could be appointed to this institution.297
Third, an independent institution could be charged to draw up and
develop more concrete and binding guidelines that OCSSPs and
rightholders could rely on when fulfilling their obligations under Article
17(4). Users would equally benefit from more guidance on the distinction
between lawful and unlawful uses. The experience that could be gathered
by an independent copyright body would be invaluable not only for
mediating between OCSSPs, users and rightholder. 298 This experience
could also help to identify and justify further need for harmonization of
substantive copyright law and monitor the necessity to adapt the
legislative framework to adapt it to new technological, economic and
societal circumstances.
However, until such an independent system or further guarantees to
secure FR-compliant filtering measures are put in place at EU level, Art.
17(4) seems very hard to reconcile with the FR guaranteed by both the
EU Charter and the ECHR.
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CONCLUSIONS
The problem with Article 17 is its incompatibility with the Treaties of
the EU and the fundamental basic principles of EU law. First, the
contradictions and vague concepts which we have exposed above turn the
transposition of Article 17 into an extremely complicated exercise for
national legislators. It is at the national level where important normative
decisions will have to be made, which impact on the fundamental rights
of users, rightholders and platform operators. However, after the Schrems
II ruling it is clear that such normative determinations under EU law must
be made by the EU legislator and cannot be left to national parliaments.
Second, the difficult task left to national legislators under the current
formulation of Article 17will very likely not lead to a level of
harmonization that would have justified the exercise of Article 114 TFEU
as legal basis for internal market harmonization.299 Draft implementation
bills of the Directive in several Member States are already showing that
Article 17 will be implemented in various diverging ways, which will
augment the confusion already created by a provision with unclear
wording and conflicting aims to the detriment of the creation of a true
Digital Single Market.300
Article 17 creates a complicated construct of rights and obligations
299
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that seems to be based on the assumption that a balance within this
construct can be maintained and adjusted by technological means. “The
answer to the machine is in the machine”, to quote a famous article of the
1990s301, at a time where all hopes were put by rightholders and
subsequently policy makers in technology- namely technical protection
measures- to solve the difficulties to enforce copyright in the digital
environment.302 Despite huge efforts in the EU and worldwide, we know
that technical protection has not solved the issue of mass infringements
of copyright law. Twenty years later, it seems that the same mistakes are
made.
Filtering technology has not reached the level of sophistication that
would avoid most collateral effects. As a result, the balance between the
FR must be struck by private parties through a system of cooperation
between rightholders and OCSSPs and quasi-adjudication of user
complaints. In the formulation of Article 17, an external arbiter which
would ensure compliance with FR is missing. “The answer to the machine
should not be in the machine”, or in short: what the is acceptable online
or what is not needs to be decided collectively and not by a few, and via
independent mechanisms that duly safeguards FR.303
Furthermore, Article 17 fails to provide specific guidance on the
priority of outcomes. Whether the requirement to make works and other
subject matter unavailable to protect the rights of rightholders is absolute,
or whether the rights of users to perform lawful acts have to be given
priority when OCSSPs design their mechanism to comply with their own
obligations, is not apparent from the legal text. This is arguably so because
a strict determination based on general standards how a proper balance
must be struck is difficult. The reference to proportionality as an arbiter
between the competing FR is also unhelpful because the obligations and
guarantees established in Article 17 are extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to reconcile.
Without external intervention decisions whether to prioritise the rights
of rightholders or the rights of users would fall to OCSSPs, who would
have to invest significant resources to make this decision on countless of
occasions. This is further problematic for two reasons. First, the immense
efforts required would restrict their freedom to conduct a business,
especially if OCSSPs would have to act as a quasi-judicial actor. Second,
and more importantly, OCSSPs lack the legitimacy to make such
decision, which should be reserved to an independent body that considers
the interests of all involved parties form a more neutral normative
301
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perspective and can apply all necessary procedural safeguards.
By failing to properly address the FR tension in online enforcement
on content-sharing platforms, Article 17 does not provide for a legal
framework that creates a proper balance between the various interest and
FR. In its current form, it is difficult not to consider it in violation of
Article 11 EUCFR, but also other FR, including the right to property and
the freedom to conduct a business.
It is clear that the implementation of the various obligations arising
under Article 17 requires careful consideration. The general wording of
Article 17(4) leaves much room for flexibility which can be exercised
either by strict and detailed legislative prescription, or by imposing
outcome-based due diligence obligations for OCSSPs. The question
whether Article 17(4) requires OCSSPs to filter, however, does not arise.
Under the technological framework described in this article, the
fulfilment of the obligation to ensure the unavailability of content or
prevent the upload of works which have been notified can only be
achieved by installing filters that identify infringing content before it
becomes available (again).
Therefore, the use of filtering technology should be carefully
monitored not by OCSSPs themselves, but by an external institution,
which serves as a supervisory authority on the subject matter which
platforms can filter. The introduction of an independent institution would
serve to recognize that the platform landscape has “drastically
changed”304 since the adoption of the ECD and that other mechanisms are
required to ensure the rights of all interested parties.
An independent institution would not leave the adaptation to these
new circumstances solely in the hands of private parties who would
negotiate above the heads of users what content to filter, but it would take
the responsibility to make important decisions on the balancing of rights
and FR. Such a ‘judicial intermediary’ should further be tasked to develop
guidelines and good practices that OCSSPs can rely on and when
determining whether they comply with the “best efforts” requirement
under Article 17(4). We thus believe that only the creation of an
independent entity, combined with a more concrete pronunciation of the
balance of rights and obligation under Article 17 in the future would
guarantee a FR-compliant implementation of Article 17 and construct a
socially accepted and acceptable system of liability for content uploaded
by users. In the absence of such an institution, it is hard to imagine how
the provision could be “saved” from a complete annulment by the CJEU.
The annulment of this unworkable provision would then give the
European legislator a great opportunity to elaborate a balanced liability
regime for platforms and to implement it in a manner compliant with
fundamental rights. This could be done without difficulty in the context
of the ongoing discussion of the proposed Digital Service Act305, which
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main purpose is in fact to regulate the activities and responsibilities of
platforms306 and which faces similar challenges with regard to the
protection of fundamental rights.307 The proposed regulation would then
be able to create a unified, horizontal and clearer approach to deal with
illegal content online, coupled with an appropriate independent EU
institutional monitoring and control mechanism. Indeed, an exciting
perspective for the creation of a performing, competitive but at the same
time ethical digital single market in the EU.
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